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A Prince who wishes to remain in power is often forced to be
other than good. When the group whose support he deems vi-
tal to his survival is corrupt - be it the common people, the
soldiers, or the nobility - he must follow their inclinations in
order to satisfy them. In such a case, good deeds become his
enemies.
- Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince
The history of government corruption is as old as the history of
government itself. Corruption in the public sector, however, is not
an unvarying phenomenon; it exists in different forms around the
world. This article is concerned with two such forms: "convention-
al corruption" and "unconventional corruption."
Conventional corruption occurs when government officials ille-
gally abuse public office for private gain. Illegal quid pro quo
transactions, including acts of bribery, are examples of conven-
tional corruption. In contrast, unconventional corruption occurs
when elected officials make decisions without regard for the public
interest, but in lieu of an illegal quid pro quo transaction, in order
to achieve re-election to public office. This form of corruption of-
ten involves decision-making that is undertaken with the purpose
of inducing private parties to make contributions and independent
expenditures for the benefit of a re-election campaign. Thus, un-
conventional corruption involves decision-making that is under-
taken with the purpose of serving a relatively small group of polit-
ical funders and spenders, rather than decision-making that is
done with the purpose of serving the people.
There is no blanket solution for dealing with both conventional
and unconventional corruption. These different forms of corrup-
tion require different solutions. Specifically, in regard to conven-
tional corruption, a separation of powers, complete with a system
of checks and balances, must exist in government so that laws
may be appropriately enacted by the legislature, effectively en-
forced by the executive, and impartially interpreted by the judici-
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ary. When protections against conventional corruption are
properly implemented, private parties who have become accus-
tomed to offering bribes (or otherwise inducing conventional cor-
ruption) must seek alternative means of achieving their objectives.
Such alternative means often take the form of campaign contribu-
tions and independent expenditures.
Elected officials in transition countries that have recently im-
plemented protections against conventional corruption are espe-
cially susceptible to the influence of campaign contributions and
independent expenditures because they can no longer illegally
abuse their office to divert public funds for campaign purposes.
Elected officials in such countries are thus likely to develop an
improper dependency on campaign cash, which leads to an incen-
tive to engage in unconventional corruption. Therefore, once a
country effectively reduces conventional corruption, it must then
set its sights on combating unconventional corruption. In order to
curtail unconventional corruption, the people and their elected
representatives must gather the political will to end improper de-
pendencies on large campaign contributions and independent ex-
penditures.
This article will analyze corruption in the United States and
Kenya, two countries at different stages in their development,
with the purpose of providing solutions based on the specific forms
of corruption that have thrived, and continue to exist, within each
country. Part I describes the two forms of corruption that are the
focus of this article: conventional corruption and unconventional
corruption. Part II provides the different solutions for conven-
tional and unconventional corruption. Part III highlights the his-
tory of conventional and unconventional corruption in a developed
country, the United States, and provides solutions for the United
States to effectively combat the unconventional form of corruption
that currently flourishes within its borders. Part IV highlights
the history of conventional corruption in a developing country,
Kenya, and provides solutions for Kenya to effectively combat an
inevitable rise in unconventional corruption.
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I. DIFFERENT FORMS OF CORRUPTION
A. Conventional Corruption
Conventional corruption occurs when government officials ille-
gally abuse public office for private gain. Illegal quid pro quo'
transactions, including acts of bribery, are examples of conven-
tional corruption. Modern institutions and academic scholars typ-
ically associate these kinds of activities with the concept of corrup-
tion.2 This is primarily because conventional corruption, as op-
posed to unconventional corruption, is illegal by definition.
Conventional corruption can be further broken down into two
basic kinds: grand corruption and petty corruption. Grand cor-
ruption involves theft or misuse of vast amounts of public re-
sources by government officials.' This kind of corruption most of-
ten originates with high-level officials who recognize and exploit
opportunities that are presented through government work.' Be-
cause grand corruption involves high-level officials, it is often the
subject of popular scandals.' Grand corruption can be perfected in
many different ways. For example, government officials might
1. In its definition of "quid," Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1992)
references "quid pro quo" and defines it as "something given or received for something else."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1865 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (finding a compelling
government interest in combating only "quid pro quo corruption"); see also ROBIN
THEOBALD, CORRUPTION, DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 15 (Palgrave Macmillan
et al. eds., 1989) ("[Corruption is] the illegal use of public office for private gain."); Jakob
Svensson, Eight Questions about Corruption, J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2005, at 19, 20 ("A
common definition of public corruption is the misuse of public office for private gain. Mis-
use, of course, typically involves applying a legal standard."). But see RALPH KETCHAM,
FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE ENDURING PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION 58 (Wilson C.
McWilliams & Lance Banning eds., 1993) (stating that the universally understood meaning
of "corruption" is "the opposite of the public good").
3. Anwar Shah, Tailoring the Fight Against Corruption to Country Circumstances, in
PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMBATING CORRUPTION 231 (2007); Mark Jorgensen
Farrales, What is Corruption?: A History of Corruption Studies and the Great Definitions
Debate 28 (University of California, San Diego Division of Social Sciences, 2005), available
at http//ssrn.com/abstract=1739962.
4. See James Thuo Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms: Expanding the Promises
and Possibilities of the Rule of Law as an Anti-Corruption Strategy in Kenya, 14 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 407, 412 (1999); Kimberly Ann Elliott, Corruption as an International Policy Prob-
lem: Overview and Recommendations, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 175, 178
(Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997), available at
http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters-preview/12/10ie2334.pdf.
5. See Monica Davey, Blagojevich Sentenced to 14 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/us/blagojevich-expresses-remorse-in-courtroom-
speech.html; David Pallister, Scandals cast shadow over Kenya's government, THE
GUARDIAN (July 5, 2004), www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jul/06/kenya.davidpallister.
issue public contracts to private businesses for excessive prices
with an arranged kickback scheme so that both the government
officials and the private businesses benefit. Also, government offi-
cials might form companies to perform public works projects, put
such companies in the names of their friends and family members
to avoid detection, win a public contract with an artificially low
bid, and then inflate prices to ensure maximum returns.' In addi-
tion, it is all too common for government officials to engage in
grand corruption by leveraging political banks in order to defraud
the unsuspecting public.
In contrast to grand corruption, petty corruption involves isolat-
ed transactions by lower-level administrative bureaucrats who
abuse their office by demanding bribes, diverting public funds, or
awarding favors in return for personal considerations.' The indi-
vidual transactions that constitute petty corruption may involve
very little money, but in the aggregate, can involve a substantial
amount of public resources.? Examples of petty corruption include
bureaucrats establishing red tape to induce private parties to offer
bribes, civil servants withdrawing licenses in an arbitrary manner
to create a crisis where bribes can be easily solicited, and court
officers jailing people for small, routine offenses so that money can
be extorted in return for freedom."o
B. Unconventional Corruption
Unconventional corruption, which is unique to democratic forms
of government, occurs when elected officials make decisions with-
out regard for the public interest, but in lieu of an illegal quid pro
quo transaction, in order to achieve re-election to public office.
Thus, unconventional corruption is not necessarily illegal. The
fundamental problem with this form of corruption, however, is not
its legality; to the contrary, the problem is the incentive that
elected officials have to engage in this form of corruption-an in-
centive that often goes unaddressed.
The label "unconventional" does not imply that this form of cor-
ruption occurs less frequently than conventional corruption; in-
6. See PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION, WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE
FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 138 (2007).
7. PETER N. ANAssI, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: THE KENYAN EXPERIENCE 17 (2004).
8. See Gathii, supra note 4, at 412; Elliott, supra note 4, at 178, 189.
9. Shah, supra note 3, at 231; Farrales, supra note 3, at 28.
10. ANASSI, supra note 7, at 86, 188.
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stead, the label "unconventional" reflects the fact that because
acts of unconventional corruption are not necessarily illegal,
courts and academics often assume that government power can
only be corrupted through traditionally illegal activities, such as
quid pro quo transactions." Corruption, however, does not re-
quire such a transaction in order to impose significant costs on
society. As will be shown, perhaps the most powerful form of cor-
ruption today is the unconventional form, which does not depend
on the existence of a quid pro quo.12
To be clear, the unconventional corrupt act is not the contrib-
uting or spending of money by private individuals and entities or
the intermediary actions of lobbyists; rather, it is the elected offi-
cial's decision to act without regard for the public interest in order
to induce private individuals and entities to make contributions
and independent expenditures for the benefit of a re-election cam-
paign. Unconventional corruption is not a problem associated
with gratitude; it is problem associated with incentives-the
wrong incentives. Instead of decisions made with the incentive of
serving the public interest, decisions are made with the incentive
of receiving future campaign contributions and independent ex-
penditures. The underlying problem is not so much what happens
in regard to candidates pre-election but what incentives are of-
fered to officials post-election. 3 Unconventional corruption, there-
fore, does not represent an ex-post effect whereby elected officials
take a position on a particular issue because of past contributions
and independent expenditures; to the contrary, it represents an
ex-ante effect whereby elected officials take a position on a particu-
lar issue in anticipation of future contributions and independent
expenditures. As Daniel Lowenstein explains, "Legislators know
of past contributions and the possibility of future ones."14 In the
same vein, former United States Congressman Eric Fingerhut
11. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (finding a compelling
government interest in combating only "quid pro quo corruption"); THEOBALD, supra note 2,
at 15 ("[Corruption is] the illegal use of public office for private gain."); Svensson, supra
note 2, at 19, 20 ("A common definition of public corruption is the misuse of public office for
private gain. Misuse, of course, typically involves applying a legal standard."). But see
KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 58 (stating that the universally understood meaning of "corrup-
tion" is "the opposite of the public good").
12. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST 107 (2011).
13. Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, in MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 119, 124 (Monica Youn ed., 2011).
14. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 121 (citing Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Fi-
nance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 325 (1989))
(emphasis added).
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acknowledged that "people consciously or subconsciously tailor
their views to where they know the sources of campaign funding to
be."15
Unconventional corruption is not necessarily done by evil souls.
Instead, this form of corruption is often practiced by good souls
who have intentions of serving a democracy with honor. In order
to stay in office and make decisions that benefit the public inter-
est, well-meaning elected officials often believe that it is neces-
sary, in the short-term, to induce private parties to make large
contributions and independent expenditures for campaign finance
purposes. The unfortunate truth is that these officials lack the
nerve to stand up and reform their democratic institutions. In
this regard, it must be acknowledged that great societal harm does
not always stem from evil intentions; sometimes it comes from
timid, or even pathetic, souls.16
Unconventional corruption, as described, has been classified as
a subset of political corruption, whereby the decisions of elected
officials are affected by legal and illegal campaign contributions."
Unconventional corruption is also similar to, but not the same as,
negative corruption, whereby government officials make biased
decisions in order to avoid incurring the wrath of a powerful actor,
such as a politician or a private businessperson with connections
sufficient to have the official transferred, reprimanded, or even
charged with a crime." Lawrence Lessig, in Republic, Lost, de-
scribes this form of non-quid pro quo corruption as dependence
corruption, due to elected officials' dependence on campaign con-
tributions and independent expenditures in order to be re-
elected." As Lessig insightfully observes, elected officials in a
democracy should be dependent upon the people alone, but they
can sometimes be distracted by a competing dependency on money
15. Id. at 149 (citing MARTIN SCHPAM, SPEAIGNG FREELY: FORMER MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS TALK ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS 48-49 (1995)).
16. Id. at 7.
17. Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial Grease, Minor
Annoyance, or Major Obstacle? 4 (World Bank Policy Research), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=604923 (describing political corruption,
as opposed to corruption involving bribery, as vote buying in an election or decisions that
are affected by legal and illegal campaign contributions by the wealthy and other special
interest groups to influence laws and regulations).
18. Rob Jenkins, The Roles of Political Institutions in Promoting Accountability, in
PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMBATING CORRUPTION 135, 142 (2007).
19. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 17 (citing Richard L. McCormick, The Discovery That
Business Corruptions Politics: A Reappraisal of the Origins of Progressivism, 86 AM. HIST.
REV. 247, 265 (1981)).
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for re-election purposes, which is an improper dependency.2 0
Elected officials can only feed this improper dependency if they
can provide something of value to their suppliers, who are often
large private entities or lobbyists.21
Unconventional corruption is associated with lobbying efforts,
but lobbying and unconventional corruption are not identical con-
cepts. There are two basic reasons for this: first, unconventional
corruption is limited to acts of elected officials, while lobbying en-
compasses the acts of private individuals and entities outside of
government; second, lobbying is not merely the private counter-
part to unconventional corruption; it is a broader concept that can
involve things other than making campaign contributions and in-
dependent expenditures. For example, lobbying can also involve
the offering of expertise to government officials.2 2 More than ever
before, many lobbyists are just highly-compensated policy wonks
who are extremely knowledgeable in a particular field.23
Still, lobbying is relevant to unconventional corruption. Lobby-
ists can provide campaign contributions to elected officials direct-
ly. In addition, lobbyists can arrange for elected officials to receive
campaign contributions indirectly, acting as intermediaries be-
tween the officials and their clients. Admittedly, there is a coher-
ent and sensible argument to be made that money from lobbyists
does not literally buy an election; it merely buys speech that helps
persuade voters to side with one candidate over another.2 4 The
problem with unconventional corruption, however, is not what the
money does; rather, it is what has to be done in order to obtain the
money. The money does not necessarily contradict democratic
principles. What must be done to secure the money, however, cor-
rupts a democracy to its core.25
Unconventional corruption is most often associated with devel-
oped countries. Developing countries usually have more funda-
mental problems associated with conventional corruption. How-
ever, when protections against conventional corruption are proper-
ly implemented, and countries begin to develop economically and
politically, private parties who have become accustomed to offer-
20. Id. at 19-20.
21. Id. at 104.
22. Nauro F. Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, Lobbying, Corruption and Political
Influence, 131 PUB. CHOICE 1, 1 (2007).
23. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 103.
24. Id. at 161.
25. Id. at 161-62.
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ing bribes (or otherwise inducing conventional corruption) must
seek alternative means of achieving their objectives. These alter-
native means often include campaign contributions and independ-
ent expenditures, which can be important alternative instruments
of influence to conventional corruption in transition countries.
Elected officials in such countries are especially susceptible to the
influence of campaign contributions and independent expendi-
tures because they can no longer illegally abuse their offices with
the purpose of diverting public funds for campaign purposes.
Therefore, as is argued below in the case of Kenya, once a country
effectively reduces conventional corruption, it must then set its
sights on combating unconventional corruption.
II. SOLUTIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL
CORRUPTION
A. Solutions for Conventional Corruption
In order to curb conventional corruption, the people must im-
pose upon their government a separation of powers, complete with
a system of checks and balances. When powers are separated and
limited, the government can effectively enact laws prohibiting
public officials from abusing office, enforce such laws, and impar-
tially determine when the laws have been violated. In such a sys-
tem, each branch of government has an independent, but restrict-
ed, role to play."
The first step in combating conventional corruption is to sepa-
rate powers within government. This principle, where the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial functions of government are divided
among separate and independent bodies, has long been a corner-
stone of governance in democratic nations.28 In fact, arguments
26. See Campos, & Giovannoni, supra note 22, at 2-3; BArd Harstad & Jakob Svensson,
Bribes, Lobbying and Development 27 (Centre for Economics Policy Research Discussion
Paper, 2006) ("[F]irms prefer bribing to lobbying early in the development process but at
later states . .. they are more likely to lobby the government.") (published as BArd Harstad
& Jakob Svensson, Bribes, Lobbying and Development, 105 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 46 (2011)).
27. Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation" for the Separation of Powers: The
Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 451 (1996) (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)) ("[Tlhe most
important requirement for a system of separated institutions is a set of independent per-
sons exercising incomplete power.").
28. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L. J. 1725, 1732 (1996);
James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evi-
dence from American State Governments 1 (EPRU, Working Paper No. 2005-12, 2005),
available at http-//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=816045.
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that a separation of powers can curtail corruption date back to
Locke, Montesquieu, and the framers of the United States Consti-
tution.29
Conventional corruption is a problem that is most often associ-
ated with the executive branch of government. Executive branch
officials who carry out the laws are in a unique position to engage
private parties in quid pro quo transactions whereby public funds
become diverted from their intended use. A distribution of power
between the executive and the legislature prevents corruption by
enabling the legislature to challenge the actions of executive
branch officials. 0 As Montesquieu wrote in The Spirit of Laws in
the 18 th century, "When legislative power is united with executive
power in a single person or in a single body of the magistracy,
there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or
senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannical-
ly."31
A separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary
is also imperative to combat conventional corruption. If the judi-
ciary is subject to the whims of the executive, then corrupt execu-
tive branch officials are not likely to be held accountable.3 2 A judi-
ciary is ineffective if it is not independent.3 3 Without independ-
ence, the judge is simply an impotent actor who enables the execu-
tive to exercise oppressive and corrupt power. In recognition of
this, Montesquieu wrote that "[i]f [the judiciary] were joined to
executive power, the judge could have the force of an oppressor."3 4
In itself, however, a system of separation of powers does not
prevent the misuse of power. Procedures that enable actors to
stop or block the actions of other actors are required to prevent the
misuse of power.3 5 Such procedures, known as checks and balanc-
es, empower the separate actors of government to contest each
29. Omar Azfar & William Robert Nelson Jr., Transparency, Wages, and the Separation
of Powers: An Experimental Analysis of Corruption, 130 PUB. CHOICE 471, 486 (2007).
30. Migai Akech, Abuse of Power and Corruption in Kenya: Will the New Constitution
Enhance Government Accountability?, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 341, 349 (2011) (cit-
ing N.W. Barber, Prelude to the Separation ofPowers, 60 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 59, 61 (2001)).
31. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller & Harold
S. Stone eds. and trans., Cambridge University Press 1989) (1748).
32. See generally Akech, supra note 30.
33. Sahr J. Kpundeh, Political Will in Fighting Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND
INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 91, 102 (2007), available
at httpJ/mirror.undp.org/magnet/Docs/efa/corruption/Chapter06.pdf; Elliott, supra note 4,
at 210-11.
34. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 31, at 157.
35. COLLIER, supra note 6, at 147; KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 108.
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other's corrupt actions. Checks are exercised, for example,
through vetoes, judicial review, or regulatory oversight, with the
aim of preventing misuse of power." These procedures limit the
ability of any one political faction to dominate the government for
its own benefit.3 7 For example, when the legislature is given over-
sight over the executive, friction is created between the branches,
thereby enabling the executive to be held accountable." In addi-
tion, checks and balances ensure that no single institution can
thwart an investigation into illegal activity." On checks and bal-
ances, Montesquieu wrote, "So that one cannot abuse power, pow-
er must check power by the arrangement of things.""0 Also, James
Madison, who drew upon the writings of Montesquieu, stated that
formal checks and balances "oblige the government to control it-
self."41
The primary focus of efforts to fight conventional corruption in
the past has been the promotion of democratic elections.42 The
idea has been that if an elected official engages in corrupt conduct,
the public can simply express its dissatisfaction by voting the offi-
cial out of power, thereby giving incentives against corruption.
The mere existence of democracy, however, is neither an absolute
cure nor an impermeable barrier to corruption. 3 In order to con-
trol conventional corruption, a democracy must also have a sepa-
ration of powers with checks and balances that limit the power of
a government once elected. Paul Collier writes, "Some of the rules
of democracy do indeed determine how power is achieved, and
that's where elections come in. But other rules of democracy limit
how power is used. These rules are concerned with checks and
balances on government abuse of power."" Once power is
achieved, the winner of an election cannot be given an opportunity
36. Alt & Lassen, supra note 28, at 1.
37. Kpundeh, supra note 33.
38. Akech, supra note 30 (citing Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:
Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L. J. 2314 (2006)).
39. Kpundeh, supra note 33, at 105.
40. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 31, at 155; Flaherty, supra note 28, at 1766 ("Montes-
quieu, the authority used by the critics, had not advocated a separation of powers pure and
simple.").
41. KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 31 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
42. See COLLIER, supra note 6, at 146.
43. Id. at 146; Kpundeh, supra note 33, at 92.
44. COLLIER, supra note 6, at 44.
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to use power in a corrupt manner to crush the defeated.4 5 If there
are no limits on the power of the victor, the election becomes a
matter of life and death in which the contestants are driven to ex-
tremes.46
The public does not often adore a political leader who engages in
corrupt practices. Therefore, without checks and balances, a polit-
ical leader who engages in corrupt practices while in office will
likely engage in further corrupt practices leading up to an elec-
tion, such as miscounting votes, in order to stay in power.4 7 The
recent history of Kenya, a country without effective checks and
balances until very recently, provides an illustrative example of
this phenomenon.4 8 In the lead up to the election of 2007, there
was an expectation of victory for Kenya's political opposition, and
as the regional constituency results came in, the opposition ap-
peared destined to win the presidency.4 9 However, by the time the
votes of these constituencies were added to the national total by
the electoral commission, the incumbent president had won by a
narrow margin.o In one district, the vote for the president had
first been announced as 50,145 before being entered as 75,261 in
the final tally." In another district, turnout was first shown at
115%, but was later changed to 85%.52 This example from Kenya
shows that democracy, like other systems of governance, is simply
a set of rules guiding the appointment of power and conduct of
transitions.5 ' The benefits can only be realized with an adequate
system of checks and balances.
45. See, e.g., DANIEL BRANCH, KENYA: BETWEEN HOPE AND DESPAIR, 1963-2011 228-29
(2011) (describing Kenya's lack of restraints on the power of the executive during the Moi
regime, and stating that "[oince the [19971 election results became known and ethnic voting
patterns widely circulated, various individuals and communities set out to settle scores and
punish groups seen to have been treacherous").
46. PAUL COLLIER, WARS, GUNS, & VOTES, DEMOCRACY IN DANGEROUS PLACES 15
(2009).
47. See id. at 35-36.
48. See James T. Gathii, Kenya's Long Anti-Corruption Agenda - 1952-2010: Prospects
and Challenges of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Under the 2010 Constitu-
tion, 64 (Albany Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 35,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1718620 ("The President and his incumbent
ministers may have even resorted to corruption to retain their hold on Kenyan politics in
the 2007 Presidential elections.").
49. BRANCH, supra note 45, at 266-77; COLLIER, supra note 46, at 36.
50. BRANCH, supra note 45, at 270; COLLIER, supra note 46, at 36;
51. COLLIER, supra note 46, at 36.
52. TED DAGNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34378, KENYA: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 8 (2011), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34378.pdf.
53. Kpundeh, supra note 33, at 93.
Vol. 51274
Spring 2013
B. Solutions for Unconventional Corruption
While long-term solutions in regard to conventional corruption
can be derived from a separation of powers with checks and bal-
ances, such solutions are not sufficient to combat unconventional
corruption. This form of corruption does not involve a violation of
law; rather, it involves a violation of virtue. As Montesquieu
wrote, "It is not only crimes that destroy virtue, but also . . . the
seeds of corruption, that which does not run counter to the laws
but eludes them, that which does not destroy them but weakens
them: all these should be corrected by censors."54 In our modern
society, lobbyists and campaign cash are the "seeds of corruption,"
and they require censors.
The first step towards combating unconventional corruption is
to establish rules that require elected officials to disclose the
source of their campaign contributions." Effective disclosure rules
require that candidates report their contributions to the public in
a timely manner." With such rules, the voting public gains neces-
sary access to information that may be indicative of an elected of-
ficial's tendencies to act against the public interest."
Disclosure rules, however, although necessary, are not sufficient
for eliminating unconventional corruption. As has been described
by Marcos Chamon and Ethan Kaplan, the influence of campaign
contributions may be independent of any actual amounts contrib-
uted because the influence could also depend on the credible
threat of contributions to benefit the elected official's opponent.5 8
For example, imagine that a corporation announced that it in-
tended to contribute and spend millions of dollars to defeat any
elected official who supported an increase in the capital gains tax.
54. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 31, at 71.
55. See COLLIER, supra note 6, at 149 ("Probably parliaments should also set some
ceilings on contributions, and require some transparency in party finances. This is not a
very ambitious agenda, but it would at least get the issue of campaign finance started.").
56. USAID OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, MONEY IN POLITICS HANDBOOK:
A GUIDE TO INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES 15 (2003), available at
http://transition.usaid.gov/ourwork/democracy-and-governance/publications/pdfs/pnacr22
3.pdf.
57. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) ("[Disclosure] allows voters to place each
candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis
of party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial support also
alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus
facilitate predications of future performance in office.").
58. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 258 (citing Marcos Chamon & Ethan Kaplan, The Iceberg
Theory of Campaign Contributions 2-5 (Apr. 2007) (on file with the University of Stock-
holm), available at http-//people.su.se/-ekapl/jmp-final.pdf.
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If an official learned of the corporation's intent and decided to
change his or her position in regard to the capital gains tax, there
would be little doubt that such change was the result of the corpo-
ration's threat. Disclosure rules, however, would not be able to
quantify the corporation's influence or the official's unconventional
corruption.
In order to effectively combat this corrupting influence, contri-
butions must be limited in their amounts. As recognized by Sam-
uel Issacharoff, problems arise "when there are only a few large
donors, not when there are many donors who may be substantial
but not critical."5 ' This is not to say that campaign contributions
must be prohibited. In fact, it is critical that contributions not be
totally prohibited, otherwise candidates for public office, who are
not independently wealthy, would lack the ability to communicate
their message to their constituencies. To the extent that this re-
mains a concern when campaign contributions are merely limited
in their amounts, a public financing system of elections provides
an effective remedy. Under such a system, candidates who collect
a set number of signatures and small contributions become eligi-
ble to receive substantial amounts of public funding for their cam-
paigns as long as they agree not to accept private contributions
over a specified amount. A public financing system, in order to be
successful, must provide candidates with enough money to control
the agenda of their campaigns."o
Although public financing of elections, as described, addresses
problems of unconventional corruption associated with contribu-
tions, it does not necessarily solve the problems associated with
independent expenditures. In order to effectively combat uncon-
ventional corruption, both contributions and independent expendi-
tures must be limited. Unfortunately, in countries with strong
protections for free speech, restrictions on independent campaign
expenditures sometimes receive pushback from the courts." A
common argument is that money spent on campaign activities is
the equivalent of political speech, which, in order to maintain a
proper democracy, should only be limited in the most rare of cir-
cumstances.6 2 Prevention of corruption and preservation of de-
59. Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 133.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
62. See, e.g., id. at 898 ("Laws that burden political speech are 'subject to strict scruti-
ny,' which requires the Government to prove that the restriction 'furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 ("The
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mocracy are deserving circumstances. Courts, however, do not
always agree with this conclusion. If and when this roadblock oc-
curs, reformers concerned with the effects of unconventional cor-
ruption must gather the political will to amend and clarify the
principles of their democracy."
III. CORRUPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Conventional Corruption in the United States
In regard to conventional corruption, the United States is a suc-
cess. From the beginning, Americans have shared a suspicion of
government power.64 The people have cooperated to build and sus-
tain a government that is not easily undermined by conventional
corruption. This is not to say that the United States has not expe-
rienced conventional corruption. Even well-established safe-
guards can give way to abuses." Congressmen associated with
lobbyist Jack Abramoff, who pled guilty to corrupting public offi-
cials, were certainly involved with conventional corruption."
More recently, Rod Blagojevich, the former Governor of Illinois,
was sentenced to fourteen years in prison on eighteen counts of
corruption, which included trying to sell or trade the Senate seat
that became vacant when Barack Obama was elected president.
But in this basic form, such crimes are rare in the United States.
Bribery at the federal level has nearly vanished. There are, un-
doubtedly, a handful of public officials exchanging government
Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental
First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution.").
63. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 34
(1998) ("Had not Machiavelli and Sidney both written that 'all human Constitutions are
subject to Corruption and must perish, unless they are timely renewed by reducing them to
their first Principles?").
64. COLLIER, supra note 46, at 199.
65. CENTRE FOR LAW AND RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL, THE ANATOMY OF CORRUPTION IN
KENYA: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND Socio-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 38 (Kivutha Kibwana et al.
eds., Clairpress 1996) (quoting Sadir Rasheed, Conclusion: Towards an Agenda for Action
in Enhancing Ethics and Accountability in African Public Services, in ETHICS AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN AFRICAN PUBLIC SERVICES 301 (Sadig Rasheed & Dele Olowu eds.,
1993)).
66. See 60 Minutes: Jack Abramoff The Lobbyist's Playbook (CBS television broadcast
Nov. 6, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watchnid=7387331n (transcript
of interview available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57319075/jack-abramoff-
the-lobbyists-playbook/?tag=currentVideolnfo;videoMetalnfo).
67. Davey, supra note 5.
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favors for private kickbacks, but these individuals are few and far
between."
Conventional corruption has been kept at a minimum due to the
structure of government that is provided by the Constitution. As
Zephyr Teachout has written, the Framers of the Constitution had
an obsession with corruption." More than anything else, the
Framers envisioned the Constitution as providing a structure to
fight corruption. 70  According to Teachout, corruption was dis-
cussed "more often in the Constitution Convention than factions,
violence, or instability."" As the Constitutional Conventional
commenced, George Mason proclaimed, "If we do not provide
against corruption, our government will soon be at an end."72 Ma-
son's concern was echoed by many voices throughout the summer
of 1787. There was near unanimous agreement that corruption
had a degenerative effect on democracy. In fact, according James
Madison's notes, fifteen delegates at the Constitutional Conven-
tion used the term "corruption" no less than 54 times.74
To the Framers, a key component of a government without cor-
ruption was the separation of powers.7 ' The Framers understood
that one branch could become dependent upon another and that
private citizens might be tempted to create dependent and corrupt
public officials. Therefore, powers were divided in order to create
a structural maze in the Senate, House, Judiciary, and Presidency
so that private citizens looking to own public officials would find it
68. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 8.
69. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 347
(2009). But see Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope ofProfessor Teachout's
Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 399, 404-10 (2012) (arguing that the Framers
were not obsessed with corruption).
70. Zephyr Teachout, The Unenforceable Corrupt Contract: Corruption and Nineteenth
Century Contract Law, in BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED, supra note 13, at 135, 148-49.
71. Teachout, supra note 69, at 352.
72. Notes of Robert Yates (June 23, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL




73. James D. Savage, Corruption and Virtue at the Constitutional Convention, 56 J.
POL. 174, 181 (1994).
74. Id. at 177; see also John M. Murrin, Escaping Perfidious Albion: Federalism, Fear of
Aristocracy, and the Democratization of Corruption in Postrevolutionary America, in
VIRTUE, CORRUPTION, AND SELF-INTEREST: POLITICAL VALUES IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY 103, 104 (Richard K Matthews ed. 1994) (stating that at the Founding, concern
over corruption was "the common grammar of politics").
75. Nourse, supra note 27, at 459.
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too onerous to buy off enough of them.7' Thus, the separation of
powers comported with Alexander Hamilton's view that "[niothing
was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should
be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption.""
The Framers' views on the separation of powers were primarily
sourced from the writings of Montesquieu, whose name appears
more frequently than any other authority in all of the literature on
the Constitution." Montesquieu was cited often by the delegates
to the Constitutional Convention and his philosophy permeated
their debates.7 1 Corruption plays the lead antagonist to a flourish-
ing polity in Montesquieu's writings."o For example, Book 8 of The
Spirit of Laws is devoted solely to corruption within government.
In Chapter I of Book 8, Montesquieu clearly states that "[tihe cor-
ruption of each government almost always begins with that of its
principles.""
The Framers' concern for corruption can be seen not only in re-
gard to having a separation of powers between and within the
branches; it can be seen throughout the Constitution. A concern
for corruption played a notable role in the drafting of Article I of
the Constitution with regard to the legislature. The Framers were
especially concerned about the prevalence of corruption in a small
legislative body. According to Akhil Reed Amar, the Framers
"feared that members of an overly select House would become tar-
gets for bribery and corruption . . . ."82 James Wilson specifically
warned that "it is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the
smallest bodies are notoriously the most corrupt."8 3  Notably,
George Washington's only contribution to the Constitutional Con-
vention arose in the context of the size of the House of Representa-
76. Teachout, supra note 69, at 381.
77. TiE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 411 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed, 2003).
78. Flaherty, supra note 28, at 1764; Teachout, supra note 69, at 351; Duane Smith, An
Introduction to the Political Philosophy of the Constitution, CENTER FOR CIVIc EDUCATION,
http://www.civiced.org/papers/political.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (stating that "[the
modern reader must be struck, for instance, by the frequency with which the authors of the
numerous pamphlets and newspaper articles published during the ratification controversy,
appealed to the authority of the man they called 'the celebrated Montesquieu").
79. FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 7 (1986).
80. Teachout, supra note 69, at 347.
81. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 31, at 112.
82. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 78 (2005).
83. Notes of James Madison (June 16, 1787), in 1 FARRAND's RECORDS, supra note 72,
at 249, 254.
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tives. Washington "dramatically intervened"' and argued that
the House should be larger, to ensure accountability to the peo-
ple." The Framers thus decided to make the House larger to pro-
tect against corruption."
In addition, some of the Convention's most heated discussions
involved Article I's Ineligibility Clause. There was a concern that
the executive's power to appoint legislators to civil service posi-
tions would cause an improper legislative dependency on the ex-
ecutive." As recognized by Forrest McDonald, corruption was the
primary focus of the Convention's debates surrounding the ineligi-
bility of Congressmen to hold other offices." Pierce Butler, argu-
ing against the executive's ability to appoint legislators to civil
service positions, stated, "Executive may be as corrupt as Legisla-
ture - It would place too pervading an Influence in him."
In order to address such concerns of corruption, Article I, Sec-
tion 6, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides that
"no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.""0 At
the Convention, the delegates explained that this provision would
"preserv[e] the Legislature as pure as possible, by shutting the
door against appointments of its own members to offices, which
was one source of its corruption."" Specifically, James McHenry
84. AMAR, supra note 82, at 80 ("[Washington] urged the delegates to reconsider the
issue of House size. 'It was,' he said, 'much to be desired that the objections to the plan
recommended might be as few as possible - The smallness of the proportion of Representa-
tives had been considered by many members of the Convention, and insufficient security for
the rights & interests of the people.'").
85. Teachout, supra note 69, at 356 (citing Savage, supra note 73).
86. Id. at 356; AMAR, supra note 82, at 80 ("The parchment, which had already been
prepared for the signing ceremony, was hastily revised by substituting a maximum of one
representative for every 'thirty' thousand constituents instead of 'forty' as had initially
been proposed. (The parchment smudge remains visible today.)"). Corruption, in addition
to being a reason for increasing the size of the House, was also a focal point in regard to the
duration of a legislator's term in office. In arguing (unsuccessfully) against a limit for a
senator's term in office, Alexander Hamilton stated that "[iln Republics trifling Characters
obtrude - they are easily corrupted - the most Important Individuals ought to be drawn
forth for Government - this can only be effected by establishing upper House for good Be-
haviour." Notes of John Lansing (June 18, 1787), in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 82, 84 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987) [here-
inafter FARRAND'S RECORDS SUPP.].
87. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 129.
88. MCDONALD, supra note 79, at 199.
89. Notes of John Lansing (June 23, 1787), in FARRAND'S RECORDS SUPP., supra note
86, at 109.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
91. Notes of James Madison (June 23, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 72,
at 385, 386.
explained that the purpose of the provision was "to avoid as much
as possible every motive for Corruption.. . ."'92
The Framers' concern for corruption can also be seen in Article
II of the Constitution, which details the powers of the executive
branch. The executive's power to appoint judicial officers was
seen as a potential avenue for corruption. The initial draft of the
Constitution had no requirement for the approval of appoint-
ments." In light of this, James Madison suggested that the Sen-
ate approve judicial appointments in order to forestall "any incau-
tious or corrupt nomination by the Executive."" As a result, Arti-
cle II, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that the Senate ap-
prove judicial appointments.95
The impeachment process was also intended to guard against
corruption in the executive branch.9" In fact, in early drafts of the
Constitution, a president could be impeached for "Treason [,] brib-
ery[,] or Corruption."" Although the provisions of Article II re-
garding presidential selection were aimed at preventing a corrupt
or easily corruptible leader from reaching the pinnacle of power,"
the Framers recognized that even the best of selection systems
might occasionally fail.9 If a President could not be removed from
office until the next election, a President's "loss of capacity or cor-
ruption . .. might be fatal to the Republic."o
The Framers' concern for corruption also extended to the judici-
ary. An independent judiciary was seen as critical to a thriving
republic. The determination that judges could hold their offices
only during good behavior meant that corruption would not be
viewed with a blind eye.1 'o Juries were another means of curtail-
ing corruption. Elbridge Gerry "urged the necessity of Juries to
92. James McHenry's Speech to Maryland State House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), in
3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 72, at 144, 148.
93. Teachout, supra note 69, at 365.
94. Notes of James Madison (July 18, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 72, at
40, 42-43.
95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
96. Teachout, supra note 69, at 367.
97. See, e.g., The Pinckney Plan, in 3 FARRAND's RECORDS, supra note 72, at 595, 600;
Edmund Randolph: Draft Sketch of Constitution (July 26, 1787), in FARRAND'S RECORDS
SUPP., supra note 86, at 183, 189-90; AMAR, supra note 82, at 200 ("Early drafts in Phila-
delphia had provided for impeachment in noncriminal cases of 'mal-practice or neglect of
duty' and more general 'corruption.'").
98. AMAR, supra note 82, at 154, 198.
99. Id. at 198.
100. Notes of James Madison (July 20, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 72, at
63, 66.
101. Teachout, supra note 69, at 369.
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guard [against] corrupt Judges."1 02 Unlike individual judges, who
could be easily compromised, juries were larger, and therefore
more difficult to corrupt."os Juries also did not depend upon their
role for their livelihood, which created fewer temptations. 104 As a
result of the Framers' obsession, the United States gained a struc-
ture of government that has protected the people against a great
deal of conventional corruption.
B. Unconventional Corruption in the United States
1. The Framers' Definition of Corruption
If conventional corruption were the only possible form of corrup-
tion, then the United States is a success - it does not have a cor-
rupt government. Unfortunately, corruption has an "unconven-
tional" form, and in the United States, it is rampant. The United
States government, in this regard, is very corrupt, in spite of the
fact that the Framers were obsessed with fighting corruption.o
This is unfortunate because the Framers' obsession was not solely
focused on "conventional corruption"; rather, it also encompassed
what has been termed "unconventional corruption."106
Ultimately, the Framers intended to ensure the integrity and
virtue of public officials.' The term "corruption," according to the
Framers, represented the use of government power in "the dis-
placement of the public good by private interest."o Thus, corrup-
tion meant much more than illegal theft, which was covered by the
term "peculation."' Governeur Morris explicitly stated that the
corruption concern encompassed lawful abuses of power, not mere-
102. Notes of James Madison (September 12, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra
note 72, at 585, 587.
103. AMAR, supra note 82, at 413.
104. Teachout, supra note 69, at 369.
105. Id. at 345.
106. See Lawrence Lessig, Democracy After Citizens United, BOSTON REV. (Sept/Oct.
2010), http://bostonreview.netiBR35.5/lessig.php (referring to the Framers' concern for
protecting public officials from becoming dependent upon anything other than the people
alone).
107. See MCDONALD, supra note 79, at 71-72.
108. KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 58; see also Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 126 ("The
Framers appear to have conceptualized corruption as a derogation of the public trust more
than as the narrow opportunity for surreptitious gain.").
109. Teachout, supra note 69, at 375 (quoting Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare
Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1, 48
(2003)).
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ly unlawful abuses or "usurpations.""o At the core of the Framers'
emphasis on integrity and virtue was the idea that public officials
should be dependent upon the people alone,"' rather than political
funders and spenders. Federalist Tench Coxe, in defense of the
Constitution, emphasized that "[tihe people will remain . . . the
fountain of power and public honour. The president, the Senate,
and the House of Representatives ... will be the channels through
which the stream will flow - but it will flow from the people, and
from them only."1 '
Of course, the Framers' beliefs should not always be determina-
tive when analyzing modem issues.113 Many of the Framers had
beliefs that do not comport with contemporary notions of freedom
and justice.1 14 It is helpful, however, to use the Framers' ideas as
the standard against which to judge current practices.' If the
standard appears to be just or sensible, then Americans should
ask whether any deviation from that standard is something to
praise or condemn."' If current laws allow for the integrity of
elected officials to be continually compromised to the point where
the interests of a relatively small group of political funders and
spenders are elevated over the interests of the people, then Ameri-
cans must ask whether such laws are inhibiting the kind of de-
mocracy that the Framers envisioned.
110. Notes of James Madison (July 19, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 72, at
51, 52.
111. See THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
112. Flaherty, supra note 28, at 1804 (quoting Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Con-
stitution for the United States of America, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 131, 147 (Paul L. Ford ed., Da Capo Press 1968) (1888)) (emphasis added).
113. See Tillman, supra note 69, at 410 (criticizing the original intent approach to con-
stitutional interpretation in regard to corruption and stating, "The democratically enacted
public text of the Constitution recedes, only to be replaced by amorphous normative princi-
ples whose contours are 'discovered' in documents that were not widely - or even publicly -
available during the ratification process. If those normative principles have deep support
in the present day, they might have some strong claim on the modem interpreter. But a
generalized fear that the other is corrupt or disloyal seems an odd and, perhaps, a danger-
ous place to begin our long march back to the lost world of 1787.").
114. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 131 ("Of course, just because the Framers believed in
something does not make it right. They (or many of them) believed in slavery. Most be-
lieved in bloodletting. They thought it absurd to imagine a woman as president.").
115. Flaherty, supra note 28, at 1745 ("Nearly every theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion ... agrees that history merits some consideration.").
116. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 131.
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2. The Effect of Money and Lobbying in Modern Campaigns
The problem of unconventional corruption in the United States
is related to the staggering amount of money involved in modern
campaigns. In 2008, the average amount required to run for re-
election in the House of Representatives was $1.3 million, 23
times the average amount in 1974.117 Why such an increase? One
of the primary reasons is the advance in campaign technology
(and the costs of such technology). Modern campaigns that are
dependent on pollsters, consultants, and television commercials
are many times more expensive than the simpler campaigns of the
past. As technologies have advanced, incumbents have required
more money than ever before to run for re-election.11 8 Consequent-
ly, many of these elected officials have developed a dependency
upon contributions and independent expenditures-a dependency
that the Framers would have deemed improper.
In addition to problems of integrity, this development has also
produced problems in the realm of public policy. As fundraising
has become more important, elected officials have shifted to the
political extremes. It is now obvious that a strong message to the
party base is more likely to induce a financial response than a
sensible, moderate message to the middle. In other words, ex-
tremism pays-literally. 11 As Bertram Johnson's study con-
cludes, "An incumbent's ideological extremism improves his
chances of raising a greater proportion of funds from individual
donors . . . ."120 So long as there is a constant demand for cam-
paign cash, elected officials will communicate the message that
stimulates the most money, even if that message does not truly
represent the elected official's view of what is best for the peo-
ple. 121
Lobbying has played a key role in the rise of unconventional
corruption in the United States. Lobbying, although not new to
the United States, has undergone a transformation in recent
117. Id. at 91 (citing ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, THIRD WORLD AMERICA 130 (2010)).
118. Id. at 95 (citing ROBERT KAISER, So DAMN MUCH MONEY 201 (2009)); Mark C. Al-
exander, Citizens United and Equality Forgotten, in BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED, supra note
13, at 153, 160 ("Candidates are locked in an escalating cycle of fund-raising for campaigns
that consumes their time. They spend more money each election, therefore they must start
fund-raising earlier and do so more often in order to raise more for the next election.").
119. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 97.
120. Id. (quoting Bertram Johnson, Individual Contributions: A Fundraising Advantage
for the Ideologically Extreme?, 38 AM. POL. RES. 890, 906 (2010)).
121. Id. at 99.
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times. 122 As Robert Kaiser described the situation, in at least the
last thirty years, the campaign cash demand has turned the lobby-
ist into an essential supplier for elected officials."' The lobbyist is
not necessarily a direct supplier; rather, the lobbyist is more often
an indirect supplier of campaign cash to the elected official from
private entities that hire lobbyists to produce policy results for
their benefit.124 Statistics show that private entities are likely to
receive great benefits when they hire lobbyists to produce policy
results. According to a recent Sunlight Foundation study of the
200 largest U.S. companies, those that spent the most on lobbying
were most successful in reducing their reported tax rates between
2007 and 2010.125 While the average tax rate reduction for the
largest 200 U.S. companies between 2007 and 2010 was 0.6 per-
cent, six of the eight largest spenders on lobbying enjoyed a de-
crease of at least seven percent. 126
In order to maintain the prospect of beneficial campaign contri-
butions and independent expenditures, elected officials are likely
to make decisions that benefit the private parties and lobbyists
who have provided campaign cash in the past, and are likely to
provide campaign cash in the future, regardless of whether such
decisions benefit the public interest. In spite of this, the current
Supreme Court tolerates the effects of lobbying, and a number of
academics even celebrate lobbying as an integral part of the legis-
lative process. 127 However, one does not have to go back to the
country's founding to see that this has not always been the pre-
vailing view. Notably, in 1874, the Court stated:
If any of the great corporations of the country were to hire ad-
venturers who make market of themselves in this way, to
produce the passage of a general law with a view to the pro-
motion of their private interests, the moral sense of every
122. Id. at 100-07.
123. Id. at 103 (citing KAISER, supra note 118, at 291).
124. Id.
125. Lee Drutman, Lobby More, Pay Less in Taxes, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (Apr. 16,
2012), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/04/16/lobby-more-pay-less-in-taxes/.
126. Id.; see also Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak, & Jeffrey F. Tim-
mons, Lobbying and Taxes, 53 AM. J. POL. Sc. 893, 907 (2009) (indicating that, in 2009, the
average firm received a return between $6 and $20 for every $1 spent on lobbying for tar-
geted tax benefits).
127. Teachout, supra note 70, at 144 (citing Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign
Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 105, 107 (2008) and Vincent R.
Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 9 (2006)).
285Spring 2013 Corruption
Duquesne Law Review
right-minded man would instinctively denounce the employer
and employed as steeped in corruption, and the employment
as infamous. 12 8
3. The Effects of Unconventional Corruption: Troubles
Unresolved
The clue that something is currently very wrong is the endless
list of troubles that are never resolved:'29 a financial system com-
posed of improper incentives;'s nutrition standards that promote
obesity;'' environmental policies that exempt producers of the
greatest environmental harms;132 and unnecessary regulations
that exist purely so that elected officials can leverage private par-
ties in order to receive campaign contributions. 3 3 A notable ex-
ample of the negative effects of unconventional corruption can be
seen in regard to the recent financial crisis in the United States.
Government regulations, or lack of regulations, allowed banks,
and even incentivized them, to engage in risky behavior. The
banks correctly recognized that they would not have to bear the
losses of their risky behavior because they knew that their failure
128. Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 451 (1874).
129. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 1.
130. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No 111-203,
124 Stat 1376 (2010); Michael Beckel, Campaign Cash from Wall Street Favored Represent-
atives Who Opposed Finance Reform Bill, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Dec. 12, 2009,
5:30 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/12/campaign-cash-from-wall-street.html
("And a Center for Responsive Politics analysis shows that these industries, which aggres-
sively fought to water down Democrats' plans for new regulations and oversight, have long
lined the pockets of lawmakers who voted against the bill."); William Grieder, Still No End
to 'Too Big to Fail,' THE NATION (Feb. 15, 2012, 1:42 PM),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/166277/still-no-end-too-big-fail; LESSIG, supra note 14, at
186-89.
131. See David W. Freeman, Congress Pushes Back on Healthier School Lunches,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-57325333-
10391704/congress-pushes-back-on-healthier-school-lunches/; Ron Nixon, School Lunch
Proposals Set Off a Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/us/school-lunch-proposals-set-of-a-
dispute.html?sq=pizzaisavegetable&st=cse.
132. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2006); Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas
and Geothermal Exploration, Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,447,
25,447 (Jul. 6, 1988); Amendments to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) Regulations for Storm Water Discharges Associated With Oil and Gas Explora-
tion, Production, Processing, or Treatment Operations or Transmission Facilities, 71 Fed.
Reg. 33,628-01, 33,631-32 (June 12, 2006); Renee Lewis Kosnik, THE OIL AND GAS
INDUSTRY'S EXCLUSIONS AND EXEMPTIONS TO MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES (2007),
available at
http//www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/PetroleumExemptionslc.pdf.
133. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 196-99.
286 Vol. 51
would be a failure for the United States economy, and thus, the
government would be forced to bail them out.134  This was the
problem of banks being "too big to fail."
In 2010, the federal government passed the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank") in
order to address financial sector problems."' Dodd-Frank was
intended "to end 'too big to fail.'"as One simple way to provide
incentives against risky behavior, and end "too big to fail," would
have been to put a hard cap on the size of banks so that their col-
lapse would not trigger destruction of the national economy to the
point where the government would be obligated to bail them out. 137
Unfortunately, Congress was not able to effectively accomplish
such reform. While Dodd-Frank mandates that regulators label
any bank with over $50 billion in assets as "systemically im-
portant" financial institutions,138 and includes measures to ensure
that these institutions do not receive a bailout, such measures are
based on the regulators' discretion,"3 and thus, are not guaran-
teed to be effective.1 40 As a result, the banks have only become
larger since the enactment of Dodd-Frank,14 ' and the govern-
ment's "promise" not to bail out the banks has become illusory. If
any of the six largest banks today were to face bankruptcy, there
would be huge costs for the country's economy. Government in-
tervention to save a collapsing bank would not only be justified, it
134. Id. at 80.
135. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No 111-203,
124 Stat 1376 (2010) (hereinafter "Dodd-Frank").
136. Id.
137. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 188.
138. Dodd-Frank, §§ 112(a)(2)(J), 116.
139. Id. §§ 201-217.
140. See "Does The Dodd-Frank Act End 'Too Big To Fail'?," Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 112th Cong. 97 (2011) (Statement of Christy Romero, Acting Special Inspector
General), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg67932/pdflCHRG-
112hhrg67932.pdf ("It is too early to tell whether Dodd-Frank will ultimately be successful
in ending 'too big to fail' .... In order to end 'too big to fail,' the regulators must take
effective action using the tools that have been given them under the Dodd-Frank Act.").
141. Id. at 1 (Statement of Congresswoman Shelley Moore Capito, Chairwoman of the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit) ("The financial regulatory
reform debate of 2009 and 2010 provided a forum for this change, but I believe it had a
missed opportunity for Congress, the large institutions continue to grow, and I feel that we
have done nothing but further embed the idea of an institution being 'too big to fail.'");
Shahien Nasiripour, A Year After Dodd-Frank, Too Big To Fail Remains Bigger Problem
Than Ever, THE HUFFINGTON POST (September 19, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/20/-dodd-frank-too-big-to-fail-n_903969.html.
Spring 2013 Corruption 287
Duquesne Law Review
would be necessary. In the face of such a disaster, it would be ir-
rational for the government not to offer a bailout. 14 2
The failure of the federal government to end "too big to fail" was
a victory for the banks, accomplished with the influence of their
lobbyists. In 2010, lobbying by interests opposed to reform ex-
ceeded $205 million, which dwarfed the $5 million of lobbying for
groups that supported reform. 4 ' Members of Congress recognized
that if they did not vote in line with the interests of their financial
suppliers, they would not likely receive the benefit of contributions
and independent expenditures in the future, and thus, would not
likely be re-elected. Therefore, the interests of the funders and
spenders were protected, while the interests of the people were
ignored due to the influence of money in campaigns, as is the case
with unconventional corruption.
A more recent example of the negative effects of unconventional
corruption can be seen in regard to the federal government's nu-
tritional standards for school lunches. According to members of
the nutritionist community, childhood obesity is a significant prob-
lem in the United States.'44 In fact, the U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services found that childhood obesity has tripled
in the past three decades.14 5 One would think that public officials
would address this problem by promoting healthier school lunch-
es. However, in November 2011, Congress passed a spending bill
that rejected the U.S. Department of Agriculture's proposal to re-
quire a half-cup of tomato paste for any food item to be classified
as a vegetable. 4 ' The Department of Agriculture's proposal was
based on recommendations from the Institute of Medicine, the
health arm of the National Academy of Sciences.147
Instead of following the recommendations of the Institute of
Medicine, Congress voted to allow just two tablespoons of tomato
paste to count as a serving of vegetables, which has the effect of
classifying a slice of pizza as a vegetable.'48 Why would Congress
do this when childhood obesity is such a pressing problem? The
answer is apparent when one recognizes that corporate lobbyists,
142. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 188.
143. Id. at 189.
144. Freeman, supra note 131; Nixon, supra note 131.
145. Childhood Obesity, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
spe.hhs.gov/health/reports/child obesity/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).




including many from the frozen food industry, spent $5.6 million
influencing members of Congress to relax school lunch stand-
ards.149 This is a clear example of elected officials acting against
the public interest, not because they were doing what they
thought was right, but because they wanted to continue receiving
financial support for campaign purposes. Again, the interests of
the funders and spenders were protected, while the interests of the
people were ignored.
The previous examples might imply that unconventional corrup-
tion is something that only frustrates the interests of those who
desire increased government regulation. Unconventional corrup-
tion, however, frustrates the interests of those who push for less
government regulation as well. Reforms targeted at reducing un-
necessary government regulations are difficult to achieve. There
is a simple reason for this: when government regulation is de-
creased, there is a corresponding decrease in the number of indi-
viduals and entities that have an incentive to make contributions
or independent expenditures to benefit a public official's re-
election campaign.5 o As long as elected officials have a dependen-
cy on campaign cash, small government activists are not likely to
achieve their objectives.5
Unconventional corruption also frustrates the interests of those
who support tax breaks to kindle the economy. In order to test
new ideas for generating revenue and stimulating growth, legisla-
tors often enact targeted tax breaks that are limited in their dura-
tion, i.e. temporary tax provisions. In the late 1990s, there were
typically fewer than a dozen tax provisions that had a limited
lease on life, but by the end of 2010, there were 141.152 This in-
crease resulted from legislators' recognition that temporary provi-
sions can be used to constantly generate campaign contributions
and independent expenditures from private individuals and enti-
ties that have an interest in renewing or not renewing a particular
provision.15 3  Even when politicians and economists from both
149. Nixon, supra note 131.
150. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 196-99.
151. Id. at 198.
152. John D. McKinnon, Gary Fields & Laura Saunders, 'Temporary' Tax Code Puts
Nation in Lasting Bind, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703963704576005960558986604.html.
153. But see Frank Fagan & Michael Faure, Response, The Role of Lawmakers, Lobby-
ists, and Scholars in the Normative Evaluation of Timing Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 61, 66 (2011) (noting one possible alternative explanation for more temporary
legislation in recent times: temporary legislation is easier to pass than permanent legisla-
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sides of the aisle agree that a temporary tax provision is a success,
such provision remains temporary because elected officials rely on
temporary tax provisions to further their stints in office.
The members of each side of the political divide assume that
their policies are not being achieved because there are too many
liberals or too many conservatives in government. In reality, the
current system prevents both sides from getting their way.
Change for those who desire increased government protection is
thwarted by powerful private interests that benefit from the un-
regulated status quo, while change for those who desire a decrease
in unnecessary government regulation is thwarted by powerful
public interests that depend on fundraising through regulation.154
The existing system will always block the changes championed by
each side. Both sides should thus have the same interest in re-
forming the system and curtailing unconventional corruption."s5
4. The Supreme Court on Corruption and Campaign
Finance
The Supreme Court, unfortunately, has held, in essence, that
there is little that the people can do through Congress to address
problems of unconventional corruption without offending the Con-
stitution. Although the Supreme Court has recognized govern-
ment interests in preventing corruption, the Court has limited its
recognition to anti-corruption measures targeted at illegal quid
pro quo transactions. Thus, the Court has failed to acknowledge
the improper dependencies of public officials associated with un-
conventional corruption.
Since the Tillman Act of 1907, corporations have been prohibit-
ed from making campaign contributions in U.S. elections.156 In
1974, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA") was
amended in order to, among other things, limit campaign contri-
butions and expenditures in regard to all third-party individuals
and entities.1 7 At the time, the 1974 amendments to FECA were
described as "by far the most comprehensive legislation (ever)
passed by Congress concerning election of the President, Vice-
tion, and as a result, has become a favorite tool of younger, less connected legislators who
are seeking to build a legislative resume).
154. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 211.
155. Id. at 212.
156. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
157. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1974).
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President, and members of Congress."5 One of the Court's most
prominent campaign finance decisions, Buckley v. Valeo,'5s came
in response to this legislation. In addition to upholding disclosure
requirements and a system of public financing for presidential
elections, Buckley, which is often seen as the fountainhead of
modem campaign finance jurisprudence, 0 addressed the consti-
tutionality of limits on campaign contributions and independent
expenditures. The Court's guiding principle was that money used
for campaign purposes could be equated with political speech, and
thus afforded broad protection under the First Amendment.'
With this principle in mind, the Court struck down the limits on
campaign expenditures,162 while upholding the limits on contribu-
tions."
FECA's limits on contributions were upheld because the Court
concluded that they served the government interests of limiting
"corruption" and "the appearance of corruption."" The limits on
independent expenditures, on the other hand, were struck down
because the Court concluded that the anti-corruption interests
advanced by limiting independent expenditures did not outweigh
the damage done to First Amendment freedoms." In justifying
this conclusion, the Court introduced the notion of quid pro quo
corruption as being the core harm against which anti-corruption
measures are intended to fight, stating, "The absence of prear-
rangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate
or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to
the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures
will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from
the candidate.""
158. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976).
159. Id.
160. Alexander, supra note 118, at 157 ("Buckley is the seminal modern-era campaign
reform decision."); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109
MICH. L. REV. 581, 585 (2011).
161. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 ("The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations oper-
ate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression . ....
162. Id. at 28-29.
163. Id. at 58.
164. Id. at 25.
165. Id. at 45-48.
166. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
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Although Buckley may be seen as the fountainhead of campaign
finance jurisprudence, Citizens United v. FEC,"' decided in 2010,
is currently the most discussed and debated decision in the realm
of campaign finance. In Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation
brought an action against the Federal Election Commission
("FEC"), asserting that it feared it could be subject to civil and
criminal penalties if it made a feature-length documentary availa-
ble for free download by cable subscribers "on demand" within 30
days of primary elections."' The documentary, Hillary: The Mov-
ie, contained no express advocacy, but did contain a number of
negative statements about Hillary Clinton, who was at the time a
candidate for president." The FEC argued that the documentary
was the equivalent of express advocacy, and therefore not eligible
to be paid for with corporate treasury funds under the FEC regu-
lations to Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002."0
When Citizens United reached the Supreme Court, rather than
addressing the narrow issue of whether the FEC regulations
should be construed to apply to video-on-demand cable broadcasts,
the Court asked for supplemental briefing on whether it should
overrule prior cases upholding the validity of legislation restrict-
ing campaign expenditures."' Independent expenditure limits
were held not to survive constitutional scrutiny because expendi-
tures "including those made by corporations, do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption."'72 In distinguishing
FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 7' which held that a
nonprofit corporation could be limited in terms of who it could so-
licit for contributions to its political action committee, the Court
167. 130 S. Ct. 876.
168. Id. at 888.
169. Id.
170. Hasen, supra note 160, at 594 (citing Brief for Appellee, Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) No. 08-205). The Court had previously concluded that the only corpo-
rate funded advertisements that could be constitutionally barred were those that were the
"functional equivalent of express advocacy." FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,
455-82 (2007).
171. Hasen, supra note 160, at 592-93 (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 893 ("For the
proper disposition of this case, should the Court overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the part of McConnell v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which addresses the facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipar-
tisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441b?")).
172. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. This holding was re-affirmed by the Court in
Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011)
("We have also held that 'independent expenditures ... do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption.'").
173. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
292 Vol. 51
stated that National Right to Work Committee had "little rele-
vance," because it "involved contribution limits, which, unlike lim-
its on independent expenditures, have been an accepted means to
prevent quid pro quo corruption.""
The Court's decision in Citizens United has been criticized for
many reasons." One of the most questionable aspects of the
Court's decision was its failure to account for the Framers' vision
and concern with regard to corruption."' Instead of turning to the
Framers, the Court turned to Buckley, which was treated as if it
were itself its own beginning."' The result is a modern frame-
work for analyzing corruption that lacks fidelity to the Framers
and previous case law. Starting as it does from Buckley, the Citi-
zens United majority can be said to make a logical argument that
leads to a logical conclusion. However, if you start from a flawed
premise, then you finish with a flawed result.7
Buckley is a flawed premise because it does not ground the con-
cept of corruption in constitutional history.17 Buckley discussed
the Framers extensively in some contexts. For example, in regard
to whether the FEC was a legitimate institution, the Court stated,
"Our inquiry of necessity touches upon the fundamental principles
of the Government established by the Framers of the Constitution
.... ."'o Yet the Court failed to consider the Framers' views in the
context of understanding corruption.18 1 Attempting to understand
the Framers' views on political integrity simply by reading Buck-
174. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
175. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 160, at 584-85 (arguing that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Citizens United is likely to lead to incoherence and inconsistency in campaign fi-
nance jurisprudence); Zephyr Teachout, Facts in Exile: Corruption and Abstraction in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 42 LOy. U. CHI. L. J. 295, 301 (2011) (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court's decision to hear Citizens United without a developed factu-
al record demonstrates a disdain for facts, evidence, and narrative).
176. Again, the Framers' beliefs should not be the sole determinative factor on any issue
before the Court. However, if the Framers beliefs appear to be just or sensible, then such
beliefs should be relevant, and when referenced, such beliefs should be referenced consist-
ently and coherently.
177. See Teachout, supra note 69, at 384 (arguing that Buckley is often treated as if it
were itself its own beginning). Even the Citizens United dissent only looks back as far as
the twentieth century. The Stevens dissent concluded by alluding to the troubled U.S.
economy in 2010 driven by corporate excess, declaring that it was "a strange time to repu-
diate" the "common sense" of the American people dating back to Theodore Roosevelt's
efforts to fight "against the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering."
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 979.
178. Alexander, supra note 118, at 159.
179. Teachout, supra note 69, at 385.
180. 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976).
181. Teachout, supra note 69, at 398.
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ley would likely lead the reader to believe that the Framers did
not spend much time discussing corruption, which, of course,
would be a false conclusion. Constitutional history, if referenced
and relied upon, should be used consistently and coherently.182
In addition, Buckley introduced the notion of quid pro quo cor-
ruption as being the core harm against which anti-corruption
measures are designed to fight, thus providing an opportunity for
future courts to hold that corruption and quid pro quo transac-
tions can be interchangeable notions.'83 Even after the founding
era, in cases involving corruption, quid pro quo corruption was
merely hinted at; it was not seen as the core harm against which
anti-corruption measures were designed to fight.184 In the nine-
teenth century, courts frequently refused to enforce contracts in-
volving corruption, not because they involved illegal quid pro quo
transactions, but because they undermined the integrity of the
political process."8 ' For example, in the 1874 case of Trist v.
Child,"s' the Supreme Court refused to enforce a contract between
a client and his lawyer because the lawyer was hired to petition
the government on behalf of the client, which was considered to be
a lobbying action associated with corruption.8' The Court held
that the entire contract was against public policy and that the
letters written to Congressmen by the lawyer were "if not cor-
rupt, .. . illegitimate, and considered in connection with the pecu-
niary interest of the agent at stake, contrary to the plainest prin-
ciples of public policy."' By limiting the government's interest in
reducing corruption to an interest in reducing quid pro quo trans-
actions, the Court has failed to acknowledge the realities of un-
conventional corruption in the United States.
5. Solutions for Unconventional Corruption in the United
States
Unconventional corruption is rampant in the United States, and
the courts have not helped the efforts of the American people to
find solutions. Unless and until the problem of unconventional
182. Id. at 400.
183. Id. at 385-86.
184. See id. at 386 (citing Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Trist v. Child, 88
U.S. 441 (1874); Bartle v. Nutt, 29 U.S. 184 (1830); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)).
185. Teachout, supra note 70, at 135-52.
186. 88 U.S. 441 (1874).
187. Id.; Teachout, supra note 70, at 142.
188. Trist, 88 U.S. at 451.
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corruption is addressed, the endless list of problems facing the
United States will remain unresolved. As Montesquieu wrote,
"When a republic has been corrupted, none of the ills that arise
can be remedied except by removing the corruption and recalling
the principles; every other correction is either useless or a new
ill."' 9 In reference to the Latin derivation of radix, meaning "root,
base, foundation," reformers in the United States need to be "radi-
cal."9 o To be radical is to get at the root of the matter.'
The root of the matter is unconventional corruption and the im-
proper dependency on campaign cash within government. Public
officials must ask whether that dependency too severely weakens
the independence of the government institutions in which they
serve. If they do not ask that question, then they betray such in-
stitutions.'92 Unfortunately, the improper dependency is not easi-
ly curable. Due to the Court's decisions striking down campaign
finance legislation, Americans must be creative and look to other
means of dealing with the corrupting influence of money on elect-
ed officials.'9 3
To begin with, the corrupting effect of campaign contributions
must be limited. Since Buckley, it has been clear that Congress
may limit campaign contributions. However, according to the
Court's case law, Congress is not permitted to enact significant
limits on contributions that would, in the Court's eyes, contravene
First Amendment freedoms.'94 Thus, individuals in the United
States are still able to contribute large amounts of money directly
to campaigns. In 2012, individuals were able to contribute $5,000
to a candidate: $2,500 for the primary, and $2,500 for the general
election. 11
Attempts to limit the corrupting effect of contributions in the
past have focused on disclosure rules. Federal law requires all
political contributions greater than $200 to be recorded and dis-
closed."' The enactment of disclosure rules, which survived the
189. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 31, at 121.
190. McDONALD, supra note 79, at 261.
191. Id.
192. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 17.
193. Teachout, supra note 70, at 138.
194. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) ("Given the important role of contributions
in financing political campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on
political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from
amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.").
195. 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(1)(A), (c) (2012).
196. Id. § 434(b)(3)(A) (2012).
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scrutiny of Buckley,"e' was a necessary first step toward ending
unconventional corruption in the United States. Without such
rules, champions of reform would not have statistics and figures to
support their arguments.
However, disclosure rules, while necessary, are not sufficient for
eliminating unconventional corruption. The influence of campaign
contributions may be independent of any actual amounts spent
because the influence could also depend on the credible threat of
contributions to benefit the elected official's opponent.' For ex-
ample, imagine that a wealthy business owner announced that he
or she intended to contribute and spend millions of dollars to de-
feat any elected official who supported workers' rights legislation.
If an official learned of the business owner's intent, and decided to
change his or her position in regard to workers' rights, there
would be little doubt that such change was the result of the busi-
ness owner's threat. Yet disclosure rules would not be able to
quantify the business owner's influence or the elected official's
unconventionally corrupt act.
The challenge in crafting solutions for unconventional corrup-
tion in the context of campaign finance reform is straightforward.
Solutions must be devised in order to accommodate the need for
funding sufficient to enable candidates to mount competitive races
without rendering them unduly dependent on massive pools of
private money."9 One way of meeting this challenge is through a
voluntary public financing system of elections. Such a system is
premised on the notion that candidates should be rewarded with
public funds for their campaigns to the extent that they expand
the network of citizens who participate in the political process
through small contributions.20 0 With the exception of public fi-
nancing systems that provide for "trigger funds" that are released
to a candidate in response to an opponent's spending or hostile
197. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68 ("The strict test established by NAACP v. Alabama is
necessary because compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the
exercise of First Amendment rights. But we have acknowledged that there are government
interests sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement, particularly
when the 'free functioning of our national institutions' is involved . . . . The governmental
interests sought to be vindicated by the disclosure requirements are of this magnitude.").
198. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 258 n.4 (citing Chamon & Kaplan, supra note 58, at 2-5).
199. Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 131 (citing Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign
Finance Reform: A Review of Voting With Dollars, 91 CAL. L. REV. 643, 645 (2003)).
200. Id. at 132.
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independent expenditures,201 such systems have been upheld as
constitutional by the Court.20 2 Justice Elena Kagan, dissenting
from the Court's invalidation of Arizona's "trigger fund" provision
in Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
stated, "We recognized in Buckley that ... public financing of elec-
tions 'facilitate[s] and enlarge[s] public discussion' in support of
First Amendment values."203
Although the realities of modern presidential campaigns have
caused candidates to opt out of public financing for presidential
elections, an option for public financing exists in presidential
campaigns thanks to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Act and the 1974 Amendments to FECA.204 However, there is cur-
rently no comprehensive public financing system for members of
Congress. The reason for this is not that certain members of Con-
gress have not tried to pass public financing legislation; instead,
the reason is that they have not been successful. Proposed legisla-
tion, known as the Fair Elections Now Act,"' would amend FECA
and allow candidates to run for public office without relying on
large contributions. In order to qualify for public funding under
the Fair Elections Now Act, a candidate for the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives would have to collect 1,500 contributions of $100 or
less from the people in their state and raise a total of $50,000.206
The qualified candidate would then receive public funding equal to
80% of the national average spent by winning candidates over the
previous two election cycles that would be split 40% for the prima-
ry and 60% for the general election.207
Under the proposed Fair Elections Now Act, a qualified candi-
date would also be eligible to receive additional matching public
funds if he or she continued to raise small donations.208 In turn,
the candidate would be prohibited from accepting large outside
contributions.209 This proposed Act, and its matching funds provi-
sion, stands on strong constitutional footing because, in place of
201. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2813 (holding that "Arizona's matching funds scheme sub-
stantially burdens protected political speech without serving a compelling state interest
and therefore violates the First Amendment.").
202. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85-109 (1976).
203. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2833 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92-
93).
204. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (2012).
205. Fair Elections Now Act, H.R. 1404, 112th Cong. § 501 (2011).
206. Id. § 512.
207. Id. § 502.
208. Id. § 503.
209. Id. § 521.
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funding provisions triggered by an opponent's spending or hostile
independent expenditures, such as those struck down by the Court
in Bennett, the Act conditions additional public funding on the
candidate's own ability to raise funds in small amounts, thus em-
powering candidates to respond to a high-spending opponent or
hostile independent expenditures at any point by simply raising
more small donations from constituents.210
Robert Brooks, in 1910, stated, "It is highly improbable that the
question of campaign funds would ever have been raised in Ameri-
can politics if party contributions were habitually made by a large
number of persons each giving a relatively small amount."211 Con-
gress, therefore, could take a big step towards curing its improper
dependency by passing a simple statue providing for public financ-
ing of elections.212 Unfortunately, reform such as the Fair Elec-
tions Now Act faces an immense obstacle: every incumbent has
been successful under the current system, and no incumbent can
be certain that he or she will be able to maintain such success un-
der a radically different system. It is unlikely that a majority of
incumbents are going to voluntarily reform the system.213 For this
reason, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate has
been able to pass the Fair Elections Now Act.214
But there is hope. The medical profession has dealt with simi-
lar issues, and physicians have reformed their institutions from
within, despite the incentives for maintaining the status quo.
Physicians have the option of choosing amongst numerous phar-
maceuticals to prescribe. In turn, pharmaceutical companies at-
tempt to influence the decisions of physicians by offering well-paid
speaking opportunities, free pharmaceutical samples, large gifts
210. See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, FAIR ELECTIONS: A CONSTITUTIONAL SAFE
HARBOR (2010), available at http1/brennan.3cdn.net/6c782abbcalaalb762z7m6bnu53.pdf
211. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 120-21 n.97 (quoting ROBERT C. BROOKS, CORRUPTION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS AND LIFE 228 (1910)).
212. Id. at 273.
213. Id. at 274; USAID, supra note 56, at 50 ("Parties that are not in power are usually
in the best position to benefit from reform, and may supply the largest number of reform-
minded politicians with whom to work.").
214. An updated version of the Fair Elections Now Act was introduced in Congress on
January 15, 2013. H.R. 269, 113th Cong. (2013). Also introduced on January 15, 2013
were the Grassroots Democracy Act, H.R. 268, 113th Cong. (2013), and the Empowering
Citizens Act, H.R. 270, 113th Cong. (2013). Because few incumbents are willing to reform a
system in which they have had electoral success, these thoughtful proposals are likely to
face the same uphill battle that the Fair Elections Now Act has faced.
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such as vacations, and small gifts like pens and notepads. 15 The
physician begins to depend upon such gifts. And while there is no
quid pro quo agreement that the physician will recommend the
pharmaceutical company's treatment over others, the physician is
more likely to have a positive attitude in regard to the pharmaceu-
tical company and its representatives.216 Social science data con-
firms what many pharmaceutical representatives already know:
physicians are, in fact, quite susceptible to being influenced by
gifts. 217
The decision-making of physicians is very similar to the uncon-
ventional corruption that takes place with elected officials. The
physician is supposed to make judgments objectively, dependent
upon the best available science about the benefits and costs of var-
ious treatments. Instead, the physician becomes dependent upon
a pharmaceutical company. This is an improper dependency.218
Like the elected official, the physician is not an evil person. If the
physician has committed an irresponsible act, it is at least an irre-
sponsible act that can be understood. The problem is not the in-
tention of the physician; the problem is the system, the institution
as a whole.219
In the medical profession, however, those responsible for the ef-
fectiveness of the profession have acknowledged medical profes-
sionals' corrupted dependency on pharmaceutical companies, and
have made reforms, despite the fact that many medical profes-
sionals had success under the gift-giving system. For example, in
2008, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, a $9 billion
integrated global nonprofit health enterprise that has 54,000 em-
ployees, 20 hospitals, and 3,000 physicians, implemented a con-
flicts-of-interest policy aimed at making physicians' decisions free
from influence created by gifts or improper relationships with the
pharmaceutical and medical device industries. 220 The new policy
215. Andrew Lee Younkins, The Physician Payments Sunshine Act and the Problem of
Pharmaceutical Companies' Influence Over Prescribing Physicians 7-12 (Fall 2008) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1331022.
216. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 15; Younkins, supra note 215, at 9-10 (citing Troyen
Brennan & David J. Rothman et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of
Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers, 295 JAMA 429, 431 (2006)).
217. Younkins, supra note 215, at 9 (citing Jason Dana & George Lowenstein, A Social
Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians From Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 254 (2003)).
218. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 16.
219. Id. at 15.
220. UPMC Facts and Stats, UPMC, http://www.upmc.com/aboutupmdlfast-
facts/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2013); Joe Fahy, Implications of UPMC's
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bans "gifts such as pens, note pads, and food provided by industry
representatives."221 It also includes restrictions on consulting re-
lationships with industry, attendance at off-campus industry-
sponsored meetings, and industry support for scholarships and
fellowships.222
Revamped policies in the medical profession provide an example
of freedom-restricting rules being self-imposed because of the real-
ization that such restrictions are in the long-term interests of the
institution.223 The medical profession recognized that in order to
preserve the public's trust, it had to thwart the corrupting effect of
money in the wrong place. If properly insulated, money within an
institution can be fine. However, when money is in a place where
it causes even the most dependable compass to deviate, there ex-
ists cause for concern.224 Like the improper dependencies that ex-
ist in the medical profession, there are improper dependencies for
elected officials in the United States. Elected officials are respon-
sible for effectiveness of their institutions. If they do not gather
the political will to address this improper dependency, then they
betray the institutions that they serve.225
Still, a simple statute that attempts to limit the corrupting ef-
fects of campaign contributions from large donors by establishing
a publicly funded election system would not totally cure unconven-
tional corruption in the United States because it would not combat
the unconventional corruption that occurs due to independent ex-
penditures. Because the Supreme Court has held that independ-
ent expenditures, "including those made by corporations, do not
give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption," limits on
third-party independent expenditures can now only be achieved
through a change in the Constitution.22 6 Sometimes a constitu-
Ethics Policy Far-Reaching, PiITISBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 10, 2008), http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/08041/856084-28.stm.
221. Fahy, supra note 220.
222. Id.; see also Wisconsin Medical Society Bans Gifts From Pharma Companies,
HCPRO (Oct. 22, 2008), http://www.hcpro.com/LFS-221943-356/Wisconsin-medical-society-
bans-gifts-from-pharma-companies.html (implementing a policy of no gifts from pharma-
ceutical companies).
224. Self-imposed restrictions have raised awareness and provided the impetus for state
and federal laws targeted at reducing undue influence in the medical profession. See Ann
E. Lewis & David I. Sclar, Complying with Federal and State "Sunshine Laws". How Man-
ufacturers Can Avoid Getting Burned, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (Aug. 19, 2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba-healthesource-home/lewis.html.
224. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 36.
225. Id. at 17.
226. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
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tional change is warranted and necessary. As Gordon Wood wrote
in The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, "Had not
Machiavelli and Sidney both written that 'all human Constitu-
tions are subject to Corruption and must perish, unless they are
timely renewed by reducing them to their first Principles'?"2 2 7
According to Article V of the Constitution, there are two meth-
ods for proposing amendments to the Constitution. The first in-
volves a path through Congress - "The Congress, whenever two
thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution."228 This has been the exclusive
path for each of the amendments to the Constitution, and it was
the path used in 2011 in an attempt to amend the Constitution for
purposes of eliminating the corruption associated with campaign
contributions and independent expenditures. The resolution, pro-
posed by Senator Tom Udall of New Mexico, would simply have
given Congress the power to set limits for campaign contributions
and expenditures. 2 9  This proposed resolution did not earn the
support of two thirds of both Houses. It did not earn such Con-
gressional support for many of the same reasons that the Fair
Elections Now Act did not earn Congressional support. No incum-
bent can be certain that he or she will be able to maintain success
under a radically different system.230
Fortunately, there is a second method for proposing amend-
ments to the Constitution. This method involves a path through
the states-"[O]n the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States, [the states] shall call a Convention for pro-
posing Amendments .... 231 The Framers created this second
method of amending the Constitution in order to address situa-
tions in which reform through Congress is not possible, such as
when Congress clogs the paths for necessary reforms or when the
subject of reform is Congress itself.23 2 During the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, many believed that Congress should have a
227. WOOD, supra note 63, at 34.
228. U.S. CONST. art. V.
229. S.J. Res. 29, 112th Cong. (2011). More recently, on January 22, 2013, Congressman
Jim McGovern proposed two resolutions to amend the Constitution. The first, H.J. Res. 20,
113th Cong. (2013), would empower Congress and the states to regulate political spending.
The second, H.J. Res. 21, 113th Cong. (2013), would overturn Citizens United.
230. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 274.
231. U.S. CONST. art. V.
232. AMAR, supra note 82, at 16.
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very limited role in passing amendments, since it was possible
that Congress "would be the very occasion for moving to amend ."2 33
While the first method for amending the Constitution through
Congress would focus solely on the proposed resolution, a call for a
convention could involve broader interests. As noted by Lawrence
Lessig, "[D]ifferent souls with different objectives could agree on
the need for a convention without agreeing on the particular pro-
posals that a convention should recommend."234 Some people, for
example, may desire an amendment allowing the states to prohib-
it flag burning or abortion. Others may want a balanced budget
amendment. These interests would contribute to the call for a
convention. And while a number of issues could be discussed at a
convention, only the causes with great public support would be
proposed for ratification. An amendment giving Congress the abil-
ity to limit independent campaign expenditures is one such cause.
According to a 2010/2011 survey conducted by Hart Research As-
sociates, 79% of Americans support the passage of an amendment
to overturn Citizens United.2 3 5 Once public opinion manifests it-
self in a proposal for an amendment, Congress's desire to maintain
the status quo will be inadequate to thwart the movement for
change. In order to reform American institutions and combat un-
conventional corruption, it must be recognized that those at the
heart of power are not likely to change how things are done. If the
Constitution is to be renewed to reflect its first principles, a
movement originating outside of Congress is needed.
233. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 294-95 (citing William W. Van Alstyne, The Limited Con-
stitutional Convention: The Recurring Answer, 1979 DUKE L.J. 4, 985, 987).
234. Id. at 293.
235. Impressions Of The Citizens United Decision And A Proposed Constitutional
Amendment To Overturn It, HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES,
http://freespeechforpeople.org/sites/defaultfiles/mel0129b-public.pdf. (last visited Feb. 1,
2013). "From December 27, 2010, to January 3, 2011, Hart Research Associates conducted
a survey among 500 registered voters on behalf of Free Speech For People with support
from the Nathan Cummings Foundation. The interviews were conducted online among a
nationally representative sample of voters." Id. As a caveat, the survey focused on Con-
gress's authority to limit the amount of money corporations can spend on election, rather
than Congress's authority to limit contributions and expenditures in general.
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IV. CORRUPTION IN KENYA
A. Conventional Corruption in Kenya
1. Kenya's Special Status
Kenya is one nation in Africa that has always been monitored
by outsiders for indications as to which course the entire continent
is taking. Long before Barack Obama's ancestry intrigued West-
ern societies, Kenya was fantasized through Ernest Hemingway's
tales of adventure and stories of man-eating lions.236 Also, Ken-
ya's dysfunctional neighbors have always made it look good in
comparison.237 Kenya has never exhibited the chaos of Uganda,
the failed socialism of Tanzania, or the genocide of Rwanda and
Sudan.238 In place of Somalia's feuding warlords and Ethiopia's
feeding stations, Kenya offered safari parks and extravagant
coastal hotels.239
With independence in 1963, Kenya became the West's most
stalwart pupil in Africa,240 a model developing country in a conti-
nent where civil wars perpetuated and authoritarian governments
reigned.241 Seen as too important to fail, Kenya became the first
sub-Saharan country to receive structural adjustment funding
from the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s.242 Between
1970 and 2006, Kenya received $17.26 billion in foreign aid, ap-
proximately one and a quarter times what the United States spent
on the Marshall Plan.243 By the early 1990s, contributions from
236. MICHAELA WRONG, IT's OUR TURN To EAT, THE STORY OF A KENYAN WHISTLE-
BLOWER 8 (2010).
237. Speaking in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya, Kofi
Annan told journalist Roger Cohen, "What was in my head was that we can't let this hap-
pen to Kenya! . . . We'd seen a lot of destruction in the region - Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan,
Darfur - and Kenya had been the safe haven for refugees. And suddenly Kenya itself was
going!" See BRANCH, supra note 45, at 19 (citing Roger Cohen, How Kofi Annan Rescued
Kenya, N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Aug. 14, 2008),
www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/aug/l4/how-kofi-annan-rescued-
kenyaPpagination=false).
238. COLLIER, supra note 6, at 55, 57; BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A
STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE 312 (2004); WRONG, supra note 236, at 8-9.
239. WRONG, supra note 236, at 9.
240. OBAMA, supra note 238, at 312.
241. DAGNE, supra note 52, at 2; see Pia Anthonymuttu, Democracy in Practice - Cam-
paigns, Elections and Voters, Policy Perspectives: Kenya, 13 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 125, 125-
26 (2007-08); Gathii, supra note 4, at 411.
242. WRONG, supra 236, at 184.
243. Id.
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multinational lending institutions and donor nations accounted for
45 percent of Kenya's budget.24
By the end of the 2 0 th century, however, Kenya was beginning to
look dreadfully unimpressive; the stalwart pupil had become a
surly delinquent.245 Once ranked a middle-income country, Kenya
began to straggle behind, occupying a spot at the bottom of the
international tables, with its potential unfulfilled. 24 8 An editorial
in the Financial Times from 2002 stated, "Kenya is now one of the
most disappointing performers in sub-Saharan Africa... . There is
barely an economic or social indicator that does not testify to the
country's decline."247 The country was, as one Australian newspa-
per put it, an "African Paradise Lost."248 Given that Kenya had
never been invaded, never experienced a civil war, and had start-
ed out with so much in its favor, the source of the problem was
obvious - the government was overflowing with corruption.2 49
2. Empty Promises of Reform
In the wake of the historic 2002 election in Kenya, the newly
sworn president, Mwai Kibaki, made statements that reflected the
country's recognition of a growing corruption problem. President
Kibaki stated, "The era of 'anything goes' is gone forever. Gov-
ernment will no longer be run on the whims of individuals. Cor-
ruption will now cease to be a way of life in Kenya."250 However,
such words were not new; they had been uttered in the past: in
1994, then President Daniel T. arap Moi, who was infamous for
corrupt activity,251' had stated, "On corruption, my government is
committed to fighting it at all levels. Kenyans must stop the habit
244. Id.
245. See DAGNE, supra note 52, at 2.
246. WRONG, supra note 236, at 10.
247. Id. at 11 (internal quotation omitted).
248. BRANCH, supra note 45, at 186 (referencing John Shaw, African Paradise Lost,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 26, 1989, at 71).
249. WRONG, supra note 236, at 11.
250. Id. at 5; see also Francis Openda, "I'll be the first to declare wealth," says Kibaki, E.
AFR. STANDARD, July 24, 2003 (President Kibaki stated, "Corruption starts from the top,
let's not make any mistake about it.").
251. See Gathii, supra note 4, at 444 (stating that President Daniel T. arap Moi's "anti-
corruption efforts" were largely seen as "big shows" that were performed purely to win the
donor community's approval); see also BRANCH, supra note 45, at 211 (referencing Wangari
Maathai's letter to President Moi after the 1992 election in which she stated that "the Elec-
toral Commission, the State mass media and the Civil Service" were all used "to rig Your
Excellency back to power").
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of inducing public officials with money and other items for services
that should be rendered free of charge."252
Yet Kenyans were optimistic that a change in leadership would
bring accountability in government.253 When Gallup conducted a
poll shortly after Kibaki's election, it found that Kenyans were the
most optimistic people in the world, with 77 percent saying they
had high hopes for the future.254 In fact, after Kibaki's election,
there were reports of citizens storming an upcountry police station
to demand refunds for bribes paid over the years. 255 Even academ-
ics were optimistic. In 2004, Peter Anassi, an advocate for social
justice in Kenya, described a "genesis of the war against corrup-
tion"256 in which the new government has a mandate to fight cor-
ruption and "has shown the willingness and the capacity to deal
with the vice." 257  Unfortunately, the new found hope was short
lived, as Kibaki was not able to deliver on his promises of ending
corruption.258
Perhaps the most notorious example of Kibaki's failure to end
corruption is the Anglo-Leasing scandal. 259 This scandal involved
18 government contracts that were described as "sensitive" due to
their military or security-related nature.260 As calculated by the
Auditor General, the 18 contracts were worth a total of 56.3 billion
Kenyan shillings (751 million U.S. dollars).261 In fact, the value of
the contracts amounted to 5 percent of Kenya's GDP, and over 16
percent of the government's gross expenditure over the two-year
period in which the contracts were signed. This was enough mon-
252. CENTRE FOR LAW AND RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 2 (citing Presi-
dent Daniel T. arap Moi's Jamhur Day Speech (Dec. 12, 1994)).
253. Gathii, supra note 48, at 33-34 ("To many, [Kibaki's] election in 2002 signaled a
time of hope in which government reform would bring about a new way of life in Kenya.");
see also BRANCH, supra note 45, at 251 (stating that foreign institutions as well, including
the European Union, were impressed by Kibaki during the early months of his presidency).
254. WRONG, supra note 236, at 7.
255. Id. at 6; COLLIER, supra note 6, at 181.
256. ANASSI, supra note 7, at 98.
257. Id. at 14.
258. See BRANCH, supra note 45, at 252 ("The government soon gave other Kenyans good
reason to doubt its competence and honesty. In Parselelo Kantai's acclaimed short story
based on this moment in recent Kenyan political history, the metaphor of pungent fish is a
recurring trope. By the end, 'the stench of rotting fish is everywhere now.' The metaphor
was apposite.").
259. Id. at 253.
260. WRONG, supra note 236, at 168.
261. Id. at 165; see also Gathii, supra note 48, at 51.
Spring 2013 Corruption 305
Duquesne Law Review
ey to provide anti-retrovirals to every HIV-positive Kenyan for ten
years.262
Anglo-Leasing was a classic government procurement scam. A
crucial component was the military nature of the contracts. In
every other sector, contracts had to be put to open tender. Con-
tracts within the military sector, however, were secretive and able
to escape scrutiny.263 These contracts were a rudimentary device
for extracting large amounts of money from the Kenyan treasury.
As an example of the greed involved, Kenya was paying 9 million
U.S. dollars for MI 17 helicopters, while the same helicopters were
simultaneously selling in Asia for only 3.9 million U.S. dollars.26
Where the extra funds ultimately settled is a mystery, but it is
safe to presume that they were split between those in government
who authorized the deals and the entrepreneurs who provided the
essential smokescreen of legitimate sounding shell companies that
acted as "looting pipes."265
As described by Michaela Wrong in It's Our Turn to Eat, when
the Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics, John
Githongo, briefed President Kibaki on the corruption surrounding
Anglo-Leasing, the president exuded a look that could only be de-
scribed as sheepish, like a boy "caught with his hand in a biscuit
tin."266 Kibaki urged the anti-corruption czar to slow down, and by
all means, not to hand over his information to the Attorney Gen-
eral.267 Once it was clear that Kibaki realized the full extent of the
scandal, but was unconcerned, Githongo resigned and spent the
next three years living in the United Kingdom, fearing retaliation
from the Kenyan government.268 In October 2006, as a result of
Kibaki's orders, Attorney General Amos Wako refused to prose-
cute those suspected of corruption in the Anglo-Leasing scandal.269
The unwillingness of the Kibaki administration to deal with cor-
ruption did not go unnoticed. A report from Transparency Inter-
262. WRONG, supra note 236, at 166.
263. Id. at 168; see also Gathii, supra note 48, at 52.
264. WRONG, supra note 236, at 169.
265. Id. at 171.
266. Id. at 174.
267. Id. at 174; see also Gathii, supra note 48, at 51-52; Pallister, supra note 5 ("John
Githongo, the government anti-corruption chief, has warned in the Kenyan press that the
corrupt networks that held the stage hostage under the former regime have started at-
tempting to regroup.").
268. BRANCH, supra note 45, at 254.
269. DAGNE, supra note 52, at 13-14; see Gathii, supra note 48, at 50 ("The Attorney
General's office has long dragged its feet and been unwilling to prosecute corruption cases
recommended to it by the anti-corruption bodies it supposedly worked in concert with.").
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national described Anglo-Leasing as "the albatross around the
Kibaki government's neck."27 0 Also, in a 2004 speech, British High
Commissioner to Kenya Edward Clay famously stated: "We never
expected corruption to be vanquished overnight. We all implicitly
recognized that some would be carried over to the new era. We
hoped it would not be rammed in our faces. But it has."271' Those
in government were now eating "like gluttons," he proclaimed.
"They may expect we shall not see, or notice, or will forgive them a
bit of gluttony, but they can hardly expect us not to care when
their gluttony causes them to vomit all over our shoes."273 Clay's
statement, while colorful, was not terribly exaggerated-
Transparency International, in its 2010 Corruption Perceptions
Index, ranked Kenya as one of the most corrupt countries in the
world, occupying a rank of 154 out of 178 countries.274 In reference
to President Kibaki's political party, the National Rainbow Coali-
tion ("NARC"), Timothy Njoya aptly remarked: "We now know
what 'NARC' means, 'Nothing-Actually-Really-Changed!"'2 7 5
3. Issues of Tribalism
It could be argued that tribal favoritism, rather than corruption,
is the true cause of social and economic problems in Kenya. There
are about 42 distinct tribes in Kenya. 276  The largest tribes by
population in Kenya include the Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo
(13%), Kalenjin (12%), Kamba (11%), Kisii (6%), and Meru (6%),
270. Mwalimu Mati, It's Time to Tell the Kenyan People the Truth About the Anglo-
Leasing Corruption Scandal, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (Jan. 22, 2006),
http://archive.transparency.org/news room/latest-news/press-releases-ne/2006/2006-01.23
kenya.githongo.
271. WRONG, supra note 236, at 201.
272. Id. at 201-02.
273. Id. at 202 (quoting Edward Clay, British High Commissioner, Address at the Brit-
ish Business Association of Kenya (July 2004)); see also BRANCH, supra note 45, at 253;
COLLIER, supra note 6, at 181.
274. Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveys-indices/cpi/2010/results (last visited
Jan. 27, 2013).
275. BRANCH, supra note 45, at 258 (citing Thomas Wolf, Immunity or Accountability?
Daniel Toroitich arap Moi: Kenya's First Retired President, in LEGACIES OF POWER:
LEADERSHIP CHANGE AND FORMER PRESIDENTS IN AFRICAN POLITICS 197, 219 (Roger
Southall & Henning Melber eds., 2006)).
276. The Kenya People, KENYA INFORMATION GUIDE, http://www.kenya-information-
guide.com/kenya-people.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2013); see also Kristin MacDougall,
Tribal Rights in Kenya and Zimbabwe: To Promote or Not to Promote, That is the Question,
27 CONN. J. INVL L. 167, 185 (2011).
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among others.277 The history of these tribes is the history of Ken-
ya; they have cultivated the country's unique identity. Tribal
identities, however, have also been the cause of much division in
Kenya.
The tribes of pre-colonial Kenya surely recognized their differ-
ent ethnic languages and customs.27 8 When friction occurred be-
tween the tribes, it was primarily caused by economic necessity.279
In Facing Mt. Kenya, Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, de-
scribed instances where the threat of starvation forced the Masai
to raid the cattle stock of the Kikuyu when cattle disease invaded
Masai country.280 However, such raids were rare, with long inter-
vals in between.2 81 While tribes such as the Kikuyu and Masai
sometimes fought each other, they also traded with one another,
intermarried, and utilized the same lands.282
Colonialism had a definite effect on the tribes of Kenya. Alt-
hough colonialism did not create Kenya's tribal distinctions, colo-
nialism definitely ensured that ethnic affiliation became the key
factor determining a citizen's life chances.28 3 The tribes began to
feel the effects of colonialism as early as 1885 when Kenya was
established under the British "sphere of influence" at the Berlin
Conference.2 84  By 1938, the British had divided Kenya into 24
congested native reserves, leaving for the fertile "White High-
lands" for exclusive European use. Kenyans from outside of a par-
ticular reserve were considered as foreigners who posed threats to
the economic sustainability of the community.285
The tribal stereotypes of modern-day Kenya faithfully reflect
the roles that were once imposed on the tribes by the colonial gov-
ernment. Growing up on a white-owned farm in the Rift Valley in
the 1940s, the future Nobel Peace Prize-winner Wangari Maathai
observed how the colonial experience reinforced the tribal distinc-
tions.286 In her autobiography, she records that "Kikuyus worked
277. The World Factbook: Kenya, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html (last updated Oct.
4, 2012); see also DAGNE, supra note 52, at 12.
278. WRONG, supra note 236, at 48.
279. JoMO KENYATTA, FACING MT. KENYA, THE TRIBAL LIFE OF THE GIKUYU 200 (1965).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 201.
282. WRONG, supra note 236, at 48.
283. Id. at 44.
284. CENTRE FOR LAW AND RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 12; MacDougall,
supra note 276, at 170.
285. WRONG, supra note 236, at 48-49.
286. Id.
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in the fields, Luos laboured around the homestead as domestic
servants, and Kipsigis took care of the livestock and milking. . . .
Most of us on the farm rarely met people from other communities,
spoke their languages or participated in their cultural practic-
es."287 These tribal divisions did not automatically disappear with
independence.288 United States President Barack Obama, in
Dreams from My Father, notes that his Kenyan Luo father had
political ambitions, "[blut by 1966 or 1967, the divisions in Kenya
had become more serious. President Kenyatta was from the larg-
est tribe, the Kikuyus. The Luos, the second largest tribe, began
to complain that Kikuyus were getting all the best jobs."289
It could be argued that such tribal tension, and not government
corruption, was the root cause of the Kenyan post-election violence
that occurred in 2007 and 2008 and eventually led to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court prosecution of six people, including three
government officers, for crimes against humanity.29 0 The violence
occurred following the December 27, 2007 election, when support-
ers of the challenger, Raila Odinga, alleged electoral manipulation
by the incumbent government. In fact, it was widely confirmed
that both sides perpetrated electoral manipulation during the
election.291' Targeted ethnic violence escalated initially against the
287. Id. at 49-50 (quoting WANGARI MUTA MAATHAI, UNBOWED: ONE WOMAN'S STORY
(2004)); see also Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenyans Approve New Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/world/africa/06kenya.html (noting that "Kenya
has a long legacy of ethnic rivalries. It has more than 40 different ethnic groups and the
British colonizers shamelessly typecast them: the Maasai were the guards; the Kikuyu the
farmhands; the Luo the teachers; the Kamba the bureaucrats; etc.").
288. See generally MacDougall, supra note 276.
289. OBAMA, supra note 238, at 214. Barack Obama, Sr. was a recognized contemporary
of Kenya's early political leaders. Daniel Branch, discussing the assassination of Tom
Mboya, writes: "Walking the short distance from his parked car to the shop front, [Mboyal
paused to speak to a passing friend, Barack Obama, father of the current US president.
After a brief chat, Mboya said goodbye to Obama and entered the pharmacy.... As he left,
shots were fired and he was hit twice in the chest." BRANCH, supra note 45, at 79.
290. See DAGNE, supra note 52, at 1; Press Release, International Criminal Court, Ken-
ya's Post-Election Violence: ICC Prosecutor Presents Cases Against Six Individuals for
Crimes Against Humanity (Dec. 15, 2012), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/BA2041D8-3F30-4531-8850-431B5B2F4416.htm; Press Release, Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summonses to Appear
for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (Mar.
3, 2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/BFAD2A42-55B5-4791-9AFA-
28COCAF26E5E.htm; Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Deci-
sion on the Prosecutor's Application for Summons to Appear (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.intliccdocs/docldocl037044.pdf.
291. BRANCH, supra note 45, at 271; DAGNE, supra note 52, at 11; KENYA NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON HuMAN RIGHTS, ON THE BRINK OF THE PRECIPICE: A HUMAN RIGHTS
ACCOUNT OF KENYA'S POST-2007 ELECTION VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 3 (2008), available at
http://www.knchr.org/dmdocuments/KNCHR%20doc.pdf.
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Kikuyu people, the community of which President Kibaki was a
member.29 2 The different ethnic groups all joined into pro-Kikuyu
and anti-Kikuyu coalitions.2 9 3 The violence peaked with the kill-
ing of over thirty civilians in a church near Eldoret on New Year's
Day.294 Some Kikuyu coalitions also engaged in retaliatory vio-
lence against groups supportive of Odinga, primarily Luos and
Kalenjin, in the towns of Nakuru and Naivasha.29 5
If tribal self-awareness and tension is at the heart of the societal
problems in Kenya, then corruption can be explained as a mere
by-product of public officials' instinct for tribal patronage. That is,
public officials have an incentive to extort monies against the pub-
lic interest only because they are expected to provide for their
kinsman over the interests of other Kenyans, or Kenyans as a
whole. With this perspective, it would follow that any big picture
solution for Kenya must initially target a reduction in tribal iden-
tities and self-awareness.
However, in addition to the negative aspects, there are positive
aspects of the tribal identities in Kenya.296 As recognized by Jomo
Kenyatta, the key to this culture is the tribal system.297 Within
the tribal system are family groups and age-grades, which shape
the character of every member of the society. In this system, no-
body is an isolated individual.2 98 The people of Kenya collectively
recognized the importance of their tribal history as recently as
2010, when they established a new constitution. The Preamble to
292. DAGNE, supra note 52, at 1; Samir Eihawary, Crisis in Kenya: Land, Displacement
and the Search for 'Durable Solutions,' 31 HPG POL'Y BRIEF 1 (Apr. 2008), available at
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2263.pdf.
293. COLLIER, supra note 46, at 57.
294. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Case No.,
T[ 234-235 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.ice-cpi.intliccdocs/doc/docl314535.pdf, BRANCH,
supra note 45, at 273-74.
295. BRANCH , supra note 45, at 275-76; see Press Release, International Criminal Court,
Summary of Decision in the Two Kenya cases (Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.ice-
cpi.int/en menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situationssituation%20icc%200109/relate
d%20cases/iccOlO9Olll/background%20information/Pages/summary%2Oof%/o20decision%20i
n%20the%20two%20kenya%20cases.aspx (determining that the Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court had provided enough evidence of crimes against humanity for trial in
regard to for four Kenyan suspects - William Ruto, Joshua Arap Sang, Francis Muthaura,
and Uhuru Kenyatta - collectively referred to after the prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, as
the "Ocampo four").
296. BRANCH, supra note 45, at 293.
297. KENYATTA, supra note 279, at 305 (stating that "a culture has no meaning apart
from the social organisation of life on which it is built").
298. Id. at 298 ("The Gikuyu does not think of his tribe as a group of individuals organ-
ised collectively, for he does not think of himself as a social unit. It is rather the widening-
out of the family by a natural process of growth and division.").
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the Constitution of Kenya now reads, "We, the people of Kenya ...
proud of our ethnic, cultural and religious diversity . . . adopt, en-
act and give this Constitution to ourselves and to our future gen-
erations."299
In light of this, solutions focused on erasing tribal identities are
neither ideal nor practical. However, a big picture solution that
initially targets the detection and enforcement of corrupt acts will
reduce the amount of tribal patronage that occurs in government
and, in turn, reduce the feelings of hostility that may occasionally
exist between the tribes. On this point, it is important to recog-
nize that government favoritism based on tribal associations is an
effect of corruption, not a cause.00 It is possible to preserve tribal
heritage while decreasing the kind of conduct that ultimately
leads to hostilities.
There is a need for the people to be informed about corrupt prac-
tices in government.301 A free press is essential for fighting cor-
ruption302 and can play a key role in the detection of corruption."
The press in Kenya has been detecting corruption in government
for years.304 As noted in James Forole Jarso's account of the Ken-
yan media's relationship to anti-corruption efforts, "In Kenya,
hardly a day passes without the media highlighting corruption in
the government.""0 s Nearly all of the Kenyan newspapers have
featured a litany of articles citing occurrences of corruption that
are eating into the very fabric of Kenyan society, yet corruption
continues.306 Thus, detection is not sufficient to effectively combat
corruption. Solutions for corruption must be preemptive. A sepa-
299. CONSTITUTION, pmbl. (2010) (Kenya) (emphasis added).
300. BRANCH, supra note 45, at 21-22 ("Rather than using their control of institutions
like parliament, the presidency or the judiciary to protect Kenyans and their livelihoods,
elites in power have tended to use their power to seize resources, of which the most im-
portant has been land. The symptoms of this crisis, including ethnic division and political
violence, are all too often confused with its cause."); CENTRE FOR LAW AND RESEARCH
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 110.
301. COLLIER, supra note 6, at xii.
302. Id. at 48.
303. USAID, supra note 56, at 43.
304. CENTRE FOR LAW AND RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 168. But see
BRANCH, supra note 45, at 20-21, 119 (2011) (noting that while Kenya generally has a free
press, there have been limits to this freedom, evidenced by a culture of self-censorship that
took hold of the newsrooms of the main daily papers in the 1970s in response to Kenyatta's
efforts to quash all opposition).
305. James Forole Jarso, The Media and the Anti-Corruption Crusade in Kenya: Weigh-
ing the Achievements, Challenges, and Prospects, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 33, 35 (2010).
306. CENTRE FOR LAW AND RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 123; see also
BRANCH, supra note 45, at 20-21 (noting the existence of a fairly open press and the ability
of elites to commit corrupt acts remaining unchecked).
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ration of powers, complete with checks and balances, must be es-
tablished in order to prevent corruption from occurring in the first
place. This was the goal of the framers, and the hope of the citi-
zens, when they wrote and voted into law the Kenya Constitution
of 2010.107
4. A New Constitution to Combat Conventional Corruption
An entrenched culture of conventional corruption is extremely
difficult to transform."os Reducing this form of corruption requires
reform of political institutions that are often resistant to change.309
Public officials often resist change because the status quo serves
their interests.1 o Although some institutions change over time,
constitutional features, such as executive relations with the legis-
lative and judicial branches, are often difficult to replace."1 Thus,
it is not impossible to understand how countries with corrupt gov-
ernments can become caught in a downward spiral of hopeless-
ness.312 In spite of this, Kenya has made real efforts to free itself
from such a downward spiral by enacting a new constitution that
alters the relations between the executive and the other branches
of government. After extensive vetting sessions, the new constitu-
tion was presented to the public for approval, which it obtained by
an overwhelming majority, on August 4, 2010.313 These constitu-
tional changes were implemented in an effort to control corruption
307. BRANCH, supra note 45, at 21 ("What the culture of impunity meant in practice was
that the government's control over the police, judiciary and electoral system ensured that
there was no possibility of punishment for major crimes, even if they attracted considerable
attention and censure in the press. The constitution ratified in 2010 is meant to address
these matters. . . ."); Zareen Iqbal, Kenya's New Constitution: Erasing the Imperial Presi-
dency, INTL INST. FOR JUST. AND DEV. (Sept. 22, 2010),
http://www.iijd.org/index.php/news/entry/kenyas-new-constitution-erasing-the-imperial-
presidency; Gettleman, supra note 287.
308. Mark A. Glaser, Networks and Collaborative Solutions for Performance Measure-
ment and Improvements in Sub-Saharan Africa, in PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
COMBATING CORRUPTION 89, 124 (Anwar Shah ed., 2007). See generally COLLIER, supra
note 6.
309. David S. Brown, Michael Touchton, & Andrew B. Whitford, Political Polarization as
a Constraint on Government: Evidence from Corruption 23 (Working Paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=782845.
310. Matthew Andrews & Anwar Shah, Citizen-Centered Governance: A New Approach
to Public Sector Reform, in BRINGING CIVILITY IN GOVERNANCE 153 (Anwar Shah ed., 2005).
311. Brown, Touchton, & Whitford, supra note 309, at 23.
312. Glaser, supra note 308, at 124.
313. DAGNE, supra note 52, at 1; Gettleman, supra note 287.
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and maintain an appropriate balance of power within the govern-
ment.314
In the time leading up to the Kenya Constitution of 2010, the
negative effects of corruption were evident to every Kenyan, in-
cluding those in power. For example, the Kenyan Court of Ap-
peals, in a 2006 decision concerning an alleged corrupt act of a
public official, declared:
Corruption is equally a cancer which robs the society in gen-
eral but more particularly the poor when resources of a coun-
try whether public or privately controlled are siphoned into
local or foreign accounts for the benefit of a few individuals or
groups thereof... . It is a form of terrorism and tyranny to the
poor, the majority of our population.315
The Kenya Constitution of 2010 provides for greater separation
of powers within the government. Specifically, the legislature is
now more independent of the executive. Previously, there were
few incentives for legislators to enforce checks on the executive
due to a lack of separation between the branches that allowed the
executive to appoint legislators to be government ministers. To
remedy this situation, the new constitution provides that "cabinet
secretaries shall not be legislators."316 In addition, cabinet secre-
taries can now be removed without approval by the president if a
majority of the members of the National Assembly adopt a resolu-
tion based on recommendations of a select committee.317 This pro-
vision seals a loophole that allowed ministers to stay in office even
when the legislature had lost confidence in them."' Also, cabinet
secretaries must now appear before committees of the legislature
whenever they are summoned and provide the legislature with
"full and regular" reports concerning matters under their con-
trol.1
314. Iqbal, supra note 307; Gettleman, supra note 287; see CONSTITUTION, art. 10(2)(c)
(2010) (Kenya) ("The national values and principles of governance include . . . good govern-
ance, integrity, transparency and accountability.").
315. Christopher Ndarathi Murungaru v. Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission & Anoth-
er (2006), eKLR 1, 46-47 (Kenya), available at
http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/Reports/WebsiteJudicialDecisions/feb_07/Dr._Christopher
Murungaru vjKACC_(2006).pdf.
316. CONSTITUTION, art. 152(3) (2010) (Kenya).
317. Id. art. 152(5)(c), (6)-{10); Akech, supra note 30, at 384.
318. Akech, supra note 30, at 384.
319. CONSTITUTION, art. 153(3), (4)(b) (2010) (Kenya); Akech, supra note 30, at 385;
Iqbal, supra note 307.
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The new constitution also changes the relations between the ex-
ecutive and the judiciary. Previously, undue influence on the judi-
ciary from the executive was a significant catalyst for conventional
corruption. The new constitution gives the judiciary autonomy
from the executive by providing that the president will now ap-
point the chief justice and the judges of the superior courts subject
to the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission ("JSC")
and the approval of the National Assembly.320 This new procedure
was recently challenged when President Kibaki attempted to ap-
point the chief justice without consulting the JSC. However, after
a public outcry, the new constitution was enforced to prevent such
action.321
In addition, the new constitution circumscribes the power to
dismiss judges. Unlike before, the process of removal of the chief
justice and judges will now be initiated by the JSC. Acting on its
own motion, or on the petition of "any person," the JSC is required
to hold a hearing regarding the judge in question and to send the
petition to the president only when there are legitimate grounds
for removal.322 Upon receiving the petition, the president is then
required to establish a tribunal to inquire into the matter.323
Thus, the new constitution introduces due process in the dismissal
of judges and is therefore likely to enhance the independence of
judges.324
The Public Service, and its relation to the executive, is also af-
fected by the new constitution, which establishes a new Public
Service Commission, consisting of a chairperson, vice chairperson,
and seven other members appointed by the president with the ap-
proval of the National Assembly.325 Unlike before, members of the
commission can only be removed from office pursuant to the rec-
ommendation of a tribunal established by the president with the
approval of the National Assembly. 326 Also, in an effort to protect
public officers from intimidation, the new constitution provides
320. CONSTITUTION, art. 166(1)(a) (2010) (Kenya); Akech, supra note 30, at 390; Iqbal,
supra note 307.
321. DAGNE, supra note 52, at 2; Anthony Kariuki, Kenya: Kibaki Withdraws List of
Nominees, DAILY NATION ON THE WEB (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201102230005.html.
322. CONSTITUTION, art. 168(2), (4) (2010) (Kenya); Akech, supra note 30, at 390.
323. CONSTITUTION, art. 168(5) (2010) (Kenya); Akech, supra note 30, at 390.
324. Akech, supra note 30, at 390.
325. CONSTITUTION, art. 233(1)-(2) (2010) (Kenya); Akech, supra note 30, at 385; see also
Gathii, supra note 48, at 70.
326. CONSTITUTION, art. 251(2)-(6) (2010) (Kenya); Akech, supra note 30, at 385.
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that public officers will not be "dismissed, removed from office,
demoted in rank or otherwise subjected to disciplinary action
without due process of law.""' Therefore, public officers will no
longer hold office "during the pleasure of the president," as the
previous constitution proclaimed. 28 In addition, the new constitu-
tion provides that the decisions of the cabinet and the president
must be in writing.329 Accordingly, the new constitution fills a
significant loophole in the framework governing the Public Ser-
vice, namely that public officers were not empowered to resist the
illegal instructions of their superiors, which often resulted in such
officers becoming caught up in schemes of grand corruption.3 o
So while an entrenched culture of conventional corruption is ex-
ceedingly difficult to transform, and no reform can completely
eradicate such corruption, Kenya's recent efforts are to be com-
mended. The passing of a new constitution in Kenya has brought
about renewed faith in the political process.3 3 ' A system of gov-
ernment strengthened with a greater separation of powers that is
complete with checks and balances cannot but reduce the occur-
rence of conventional corruption within the country.
B. Unconventional Corruption in Kenya
The Kenya Constitution of 2010 provides beneficial reforms that
have the potential to lead to reductions in conventional corruption.
However, if Kenya is successful in this regard, unconventional
corruption, which is not necessarily cured by a separation of pow-
ers and a system of checks and balances, will likely become a
greater problem. When protections against conventional corrup-
tion are properly implemented, private parties who have become
accustomed to inducing conventional corruption must seek alter-
native means of achieving their objectives. These alternative
means often include campaign contributions and independent ex-
penditures, which can be important alternative instruments of
327. CONSTITUTION, art. 236 (2010) (Kenya); Akech, supra note 30, at 385-86.
328. CONSTITUTION, art. 25(1) (1963) (Kenya); Akech, supra note 30, at 386.
329. CONSTITUTION, arts. 135, 153 (2010) (Kenya); Akech, supra note 30, at 386.
330. Akech, supra note 30, at 386.
331. BRANCH, supra note 45, at 288 ("In the days following the referendum and ratifica-
tion of the new constitution, it was common to hear Kenyans refer to these events as a 'new
start.'"); Iqbal, supra note 307.
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influence to conventional corruption in transition countries.332
Elected officials in such countries are especially susceptible to the
influence campaign contributions and independent expenditures
because they can no longer illegally abuse their office to divert
public funds for campaign purposes.
Kenya is currently very susceptible to an epidemic of unconven-
tional corruption. There are multiple reasons for this. First, Ken-
ya has implemented measures to combat conventional corruption.
As noted, when such measures are implemented, private parties
accustomed to inducing conventional corruption will be forced to
seek alternative means of achieving their objectives, such as cam-
paign contributions and expenditures, which are likely to induce
unconventional corruption within government. Second, public
officials in Kenya are currently more dependent on campaign cash
than at any other time in the country's history due to the escalat-
ing costs of elections.3 According to a Coalition for Accountable
Political Funding ("CAPF") monitoring report from the general
election of 2007, interviews of 32 retired politicians and former
legislators revealed a rise in campaign contributions and expendi-
tures from KSH 4,000 in 1963 to KSH 8,000,000 in 2007 - a rise of
200,000 percent since independence." Third, public officials in
Kenya are currently very susceptible to the influence of potential
campaign contributions and expenditures because they are less
likely to be able to illegally abuse their office to divert public funds
for campaign purposes. According to the CAPF report from the
general election of 2007, which took place before Kenya's new con-
stitution came into force, each of Kenya's 71 constituencies indi-
cated that the misuse of state resources was dominant among in-
cumbent politicians.335 And finally, Kenya currently lacks a com-
prehensive institutional framework for governing campaign fi-
nances.336 In regard to individual candidates, Kenya has no limits
332. See Campos & Giovannoni, supra note 22, at 2-3; Harstad & Svensson, supra note
26, at 46 ("[Flirms prefer bribing to lobbying early in the development process but at later
stages ... they are more likely to lobby the government.").
333. COALITION FOR ACCOUNTABLE POLITICAL FINANCING (CAPF), CAMPAIGN FINANCE
AND CORRUPTION: A MONITORING REPORT ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE 2007 GENERAL
ELECTION (KENYA) 53 (2007) (hereinafter "CAPF"), available at
http://www.capf.or.ke/publications/asp?DocumentTypelD=3&formpost-1.
334. Id. at 54.
335. Id. at 35.
336. Id. at 6, 9.
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on contributions,33 7 limits on independent expenditures,33 or even
any disclosure requirements.
The lack of disclosure requirements is most troubling. Disclo-
sure rules are a necessary first step towards effectively combating
unconventional corruption. Effective disclosure rules require ac-
curate public reporting of the amounts, sources, and destinations
of money.340 Campaign finance disclosure reports are to politics
what financial statements are to business - without them, there is
simply no way to follow the money.34' However, a campaign fi-
nance system that requires disclosure without limiting contribu-
tions and independent expenditures is not sufficient for eliminat-
ing unconventional corruption. The influence of potential cam-
paign contributions and expenditures may be independent of any
actual amounts spent because the influence could also depend on
the credible threat of contributions and expenditures to benefit the
public official's opponent.342 Still, disclosure rules are necessary to
effectively fight unconventional corruption. Without such rules,
the links between campaign finance and politics in Kenya will be
obscure, and voters will have no way of gauging the influence of
campaign finance on the politicians they elect.343
In recognition of the absence of effective laws and regulations in
this regard, many leaders in Kenya have supported the enactment
of new legislation, the Election Campaign Financing Bill of 2012
("Campaign Financing Bill"), which is Kenya's most ambitious
attempt to regulate campaign finance and unconventional corrup-
tion to date.3" The Campaign Financing Bill, if enacted, would
establish disclosure rules for candidates and even provide for cer-
tain contribution and expenditure limits.345 Unfortunately, even
this proposed legislation does not go far enough.
337. Id. at 26.
338. Id. at 22.
339. Id. at 21.
340. Id. at 61.
341. Id.
342. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 258 (citing Chamon & Kaplan, supra note 58, at 2-5)
343. CAPF, supra note 333, at 61; USAID, supra note 56.
344. Election Campaign Financing Bill, 2012 (Kenya), available at
http//www.cickenya.org/index.php/legislation/item/180-election-campaign-financing-bill-
2012 (hereinafter "Campaign Financing Bill"); CENTRE FOR MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY -
KENYA, RESPONSE TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE BILL 2011 1 (2011), available at www.cmd-
kenya.org/files/CampaignFinanceBillAnalysis.pdf ("The Campaign Financing Bill . . .
sets out major reforms for funding of election campaigns, use of campaign funds in the
nomination process, election campaign and elections.") (analyzing an earlier version of the
Campaign Financing Bill).
345. Campaign Financing Bill, §§ 12, 14.
Spring 2013 Corruption 317
Duquesne Law Review
The Campaign Financing Bill specifically provides that a "can-
didate, political party and a referendum committee shall disclose
the amount and source of contributions received."3 ' However, the
Bill would not require that disclosures be made to the public: "The
disclosure of funds shall be confidential and shall not be divulged
except where such information is the subject of a complaint or an
investigation or is the subject of proceedings in a court of law."347
In recognition of this shortcoming in an earlier version the Bill,
the Centre for Multiparty Democracy in Kenya recommended that
"consideration should be made to allow public access to records in
accordance with the Constitutional rights to access infor-
mation."348  Additionally, the Article 19 Law Programme, in its
2012 legal analysis of the Bill, observed that "the obligation to
maintain the confidentiality of these records is contrary to inter-
national standards on freedom of information, and runs counter to
the objectives of the law to inculcate accountability in the financ-
ing of election and nomination campaigns."34
In regard to limits on campaign contributions and expenditures,
the Bill makes a considered effort to combat unconventional cor-
ruption: "The Commission shall . . . set out the spending limits
prescribing the - total amount that a candidate or a political party
contesting for an elective post may spend during an election cam-
paign period [and the total amount] of contributions that a candi-
date, a political party or a referendum committee may receive
from a single source."5 o In addition, the Bill would require organ-
izations wishing to support a particular candidate to register with
the Commission and be subject to spending limits.35 1
Although these provisions certainly represent a step in the right
direction, they are not ideal, for a couple of reasons. First, alt-
hough required to consider factors such as the population352 and
the communication infrastructure of the electoral area,5 the
Commission is given a great deal of discretion in determining the
contribution and expenditure limits, and thus, effective limits are
not guaranteed to be implemented. Second, regulation of what a
346. Id. at § 12.
347. Id. at § 12(5).
348. CENTRE FOR MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY, supra note 344, at 4.
349. ARTICLE 19, KENYA: DRAFT CAMPAIGN FINANCING BILL, 2011 17 (2012), available at
http://www.articlel9.org/data/files/medialibrary/3077/12-05-01-LA-kenya.pdf.
350. Campaign Financing Bill, § 14(1).
351. Id. at § 19.
352. Id. at § 14(4)(c).
353. Id. at § 14(4)(e).
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candidate may ultimately spend, in addition to what independent
third parties may spend, could present problems in regard the
candidate's ability to communicate his or her message, depending
upon the limits set by the Commission.35 4
As Kenya begins to effectively combat conventional corruption,
issues of unconventional corruption are sure to emerge, and if
Kenya is to limit such corruption, it would do well to look to the
root causes of unconventional corruption in the United States and
do what the United States has not yet been unable to do - imple-
ment comprehensive measures that are free of loopholes - to en-
sure that its democracy does not persist with improper dependen-
cies. Just as Kenya has attempted to free itself from an improper
dependence on foreign nations for its economic prosperity,"' Ken-
ya must attempt free itself from an improper dependence on cam-
paign funds for its democratic prosperity.
One lesson to be learned from the United States' experience is
that fighting unconventional corruption is a process of reform,
evasion, identifying loopholes, and then more reform. Like most
anti-corruption efforts, the fight against unconventional corrup-
tion requires constant vigilance and is not for the easily discour-
aged.356 That said, periods of transition that accompany a new
constitution are intervals when political will is strong and there is
a real chance to combat corruption in all forms."' Statutes in the
mold of the Campaign Financing Bill are helpful, but unconven-
tional corruption is extremely difficult to combat - it requires
comprehensive reform that targets the root causes of corruption.
V. CONCLUSION
An entrenched culture of conventional corruption is exceedingly
difficult to transform. However, as can be seen in the case of Ken-
ya, it is possible for developing countries to fundamentally change
their institutions in an effort to control conventional corruption
354. See ARTICLE 19, supra note 349, at 13 (noting that while "a restriction on campaign
expenditure may be justified to the extent that the restriction is provided by law, pursues a
legitimate aim, and is necessary and proportionate[,]" a restriction of the amount of money
a candidate has to spend necessarily restricts candidates' freedom to communicate their
message).
355. BRANCH, supra note 45, at 122 (noting Francois Bayart's conclusion that the rela-
tionships between African states and those in the wider world are defined most of all by
economic dependence).
356. USAID, supra note 56, at 37; see also Jarso, supra note 305, at 82.
357. Kpundeh, supra note 33, at 94.
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and maintain an appropriate balance of power within government.
When protections against conventional corruption are properly
implemented, private parties who have become accustomed to in-
ducing conventional corruption must seek alternative means of
achieving their objectives. These alternative means often include
campaign contributions and independent campaign expenditures.
If private parties have the ability to make large campaign con-
tributions and expenditures, then elected officials are likely to en-
gage in unconventional corruption. Elected officials in transition
countries are especially susceptible to the influence of potential
campaign contributions and independent expenditures because
they can no longer illegally abuse their office to divert public funds
for campaign purposes.
Too often, unconventional corruption goes unsolved because
courts do not recognize the threat to democracy posed by an im-
proper dependency on campaign cash, and public officials refuse to
reform a system in which they have had electoral success. How-
ever, where there is an improper dependency within government,
public officials have a duty to correct such a dependency. If they
do not, then they betray the institutions that they serve. It must
be recognized that when a government has been corrupted, no
troubles that arise can be appropriately remedied until corruption,
in all forms, is effectively curtailed.
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